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Abstract
This study investigates the impact of foreign aid on the relations between Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and the state in South Africa since 1994. There
are three different ways in which NGOs can interact with the state and public policy:
viz. they can support and help to implement policies, attempt to reform policies, or
oppose them. During apartheid, the nature of NGO-state relations was characterised
by political confrontation and distrust. NGOs primarily served as organisations of
opposition to the state's exclusivist and dehumanising policies. Many NGOs,
however, also provided developmental and social services to communities who were
neglected by the apartheid state.
After the first democratic election in 1994, the role of NGOs underwent a significant
process of change. Various factors contributed to this change. This study, however,
primarily focuses on the role of foreign aid and its effect on NGO activities in South
Africa, post-1994. This study relied on secondary data sources (both qualitative and
quantitative) available in the area of NGO state relations. The study also focused on
two major donor agencies in South Africa: European Union (EU) and United States
Agency for International Development (USAID).
Analysis of data reveals that, since 1994 much of the funding that was previously
directly channeled to civil society now goes to the state, which distributes it to
targetted NGOs. As a result many NOOs have collapsed because of a shortage of
financial resources to sustain their work.
Secondly, since 1994 the rationale and purpose behind international donor policies
has been to advance the New Policy Agenda (NPA), which is aimed at promoting free
market-orientated reforms and the consolidation of liberal democracy. As a result,
foreign aid donors have endorsed the liberal economic policies, which are set out in
the government's macroeconomic strategy, viz. Growth, Employment, and
Redistribution (GEAR). Thus, both government and donors have prioritised NGOs
who are involved in service delivery rather than those that are likely to challenge and
oppose liberal market policies. They have also shown preference to NGOs that are
more concerned with the norms and practices of procedural democracy as opposed to
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those that are concerned with issues of participatory and social democracy. This has
resulted in constraining the overtly political and advocacy role, which characterised
NGOs during the apartheid era.
International donors, via government disbursement institutions such as the National
Development Agency (NDA), have also constrained the work of NGOs by insisting
on numerous managerial related requirements that have been made conditional for the
receiving of financial support. Many small, informal, rural community based
organisation that lack the required administrative capacity have, as a result, been
facing serious financial crises.
Subsequently, NGO-state relations, since 1994, have become less adversarial and
confrontational. Most NGOs, complement and support the state's social services
delivery programmes and also serve as organisations which help shape the norms and
practices of procedural democracy. The study concludes, that the persistent
inequality, poverty and unemployment which is associated with the GEAR
macroeconomic policy and endorsed by international donor agencies, will lead to the
resurgence of advocacy NGOs. Furthermore, in order to resuscitate their role and to
ensure their vitality as organisations, which promote participatory democracy, it is
essential to focus on strategies, which can effectively challenge the current funding
environment to NGOs. These include, building the administrative capacity of both the
NDA and NGOs, ensuring NDA independence, and ensuring recognition by funding
institutions of the importance of advocacy NGOs in the consolidation of economic
democracy.
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Opsomming
Hierdie studie ondersoek die impak van buitelandse hulp op die verhoudinge tussen
Nie-Regeringsorganisasies (NRO'S) en die staat sedert 1994. Daar is drie verskillende
wyses waarop NRO's interaksie kan bewerkstellig met die staat en met openbare
beleid, naamlik, hulle kan help om beleid te implementeer, hulle kan help om beleid te
verander, of hulle kan beleid teenstaan. Tydens apartheid, is die aard van NRO - staat
verhoudings gekenmerk deur konfrontasie en wantroue. Die NRO's het primêr gedien
as organisasies van opposrsie teen die staat se eksklusiwistiese en
onmenslikingsbeleid. Talle NRO's het egter ook ontwikkelings- en sosiale dienste
voorsien aan gemeenskappe wat afgeskeep is deur die apartheidstaat.
Na die eerste demokratiese verkiesing in 1994, het die rol van NRO's 'n beduidende
proses van verandering ondergaan. 'n Verskeidenheid faktore het bygedra tot hierdie
verandering. Hierdie studie fokus egter primêr op die rol van buitelandse hulp en die
uitwerking daarvan op NRO's se aktiwiteite in Suid-Afrika na 1994. Hierdie studie het
staatgemaak op sekondêre bronne (kwalitatief sowel as kwantitatief) in die gebied van
NRO's - staat verhoudinge. Die studie fokus ook op twee belangrike donateur
agentskappe in Suid-Afrika: die Europese Unie (EU) en die Verenigde State
Agentskap vir Internasionale Ontwikkeling (VSAlO).
'n Analise van die data toon aan dat, sedert 1994, heelwat van die befondsing wat
voorheen direk gekanaliseer is aan die openbare gemeenskap, nou na die staat gaan,
wat dit versprei na geteikende NRO's. Gevolglik het talle NRO's ineengestort vanweë
'n tekort aan finansiële bronne om hulle werk vol te hou.
Tweedens, sedert 1994 was dit die rasionaal en doelstelling van internasionale
donateurskapsbeleid om die Nuwe Beleid Agenda (NBA) te bevorder, wat as
doelstelling het die bevordering van vrye mark-georiënteerde hervormings en die
konsolidasie van 'n liberale demokrasie. Gevolglik het buitelandse hulp donateurs
liberale ekonomiese beleidvorming onderskryfwat uiteengesit word in die regering se
makro-ekonomiese strategie, nl. Groei, Werkverskaffing en Herverdeling (GEAR).
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Dus het sowel die regering as donateurs prioriteit gegee aan NRO's wat betrokke is in
dienslewering, eerder as dié wat geneig is om liberale markbeleid teen te staan. Hulle
het ook voorkeur gegee aan NRO's wat meer besorg is oor die norme en praktyke van
'n prosedurele demokrasie in teenstelling met dié wat besorgd is oor die vraagstukke
van 'n deelnemende en sosiale demokrasie. Dit het die resultaat gehad dat die openlike
politiese en kampvegtersrol wat kenmerkend van die NRO's was gedurende die
apartheidsera, beperk is.
Internasionale donateurs het, Vla regerings-instellings soos die Nasionale
Ontwikkelingsagentskap (NOA), ook die werk van NRO's beperk deur die aandrang
op talle bestuursverwante vereistes wat as voorwaarde gestel is vir die ontvangs van
finansiële ondersteuning. Talle klein, informele landelike gemeenskaps-gebaseerde
organisasies wat die vereiste administratiewe kapasiteit kort, het gevolglik ernstige
finansiële krisisse begin ondervind.
Daaropvolgend, het NRO-staat verhoudinge sedert 1994 minder konfronterend begin
raak. Die meeste NRO's ondersteun die staat se diensleweringsprogramme en dien
ook as organisasies wat help om die norme en praktyke van 'n prosedurale demokrasie
te vorm. Die studie kom tot die gevolgtrekking dat die voortdurende ongelykheid,
armoede en werkloosheid wat geassosieer word met die makro-ekonomiese beleid van
die regering se program vir Groei, Werkskepping en Herverdeling (GEAR) sal lei tot
In nuwe opkoms van kampvegter NRO's. Voorts, ten einde hulle rol te stimuleer en
hulle lewenskragtigheid as organisasies te verseker, kan ons die huidige
befondsingsomgewing van NRO's doeltreffend uitdaag. Dit sluit in die bou van die
administratiewe kapasiteit van beide die NOA en NRO's, die versekering van NOA
onafhanklikheid, en die versekering van die erkenning deur befondsingsinstellings
van die belangrikheid van kampvegter NRO's in die konsolidasie van 'n ekonomiese
demokrasie.
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Chapter One
Aim, Scope, Method
1.1 Background
Over the last two decades Africa has increasingly lagged behind the rest of the world.
This continent has been fundamentally troubled by economic, political, and social
underdevelopment. Lack of credible leadership is often cited as the reason for these
crises. Commentators argue that for many Africans, states merely became arenas of
political struggle and enrichment and consequently there has been a high degree of
mismanagement, corruption, nepotism, repression, and authoritarian rule. These
factors contributed to the deepening of economic, political, and social crises.
At the same time Africa was highly dependent on foreign aid to deal with these crises.
Since the end of colonialism, there has been an unprecedented financial injection from
foreign donors. First, during this era states were regarded as being the panacea for
dealing with underdevelopment. Policy emphasised the top-down approach as a
strategy to curb these problems. Secondly, financial support had a functional purpose
for countries of the North in that they allocated funds to countries of the South in
return for their political support.
However, over the last two decades, there has been a dramatic shift in foreign aid
policies. In the 1970s Africa suffered from the debt and oil crises. According to
Prabirjit (1992: 1), "Between 1970 and 1980, the debt of the LDC grew fivefold to
$580 billion. Much of this growth of debt was accounted for by liberal lending of
trans-national commercial banks." These crises continued into the 1980s. Countries of
the Organisation of Economic and Cooperation and Development (OECD) went into
recession after the surge in oil prices. Interest rates soared, further increasing the debt
volume. According to Onimode (1989: 1), "By December 1987, Africa's total debt
had risen to $228 billion, about half that of Latin America but around double that of
Brazil alone." International financial institutions (IFIs) such as the International
Monetary Fund (IMF)/World Bank and governments of the West lost confidence in
the African state as a vehicle for development.
1
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The IFls and the governments of the West prescribed policies, which emphasised less
state intervention. These policy orientations were dubbed the "Washington
Consensus". They are found in the Economic Structural Adjustment Programmes
(ESAP) prescribed by the IMF. Although African governments viewed this as
intervention in their domestic affairs, at this stage Africa was highly dependent on
foreign aid because of the continuing economic crises. Thus African states were
forced to adopt these programmes, which required adjustment and reform of
macroeconomic policies to ameliorate the debt crisis.
The end of the Cold War in 1989 further accelerated these waves of policy
prescriptions across Africa and the rest of the world. Goldsmith (2000: 413) states that
"During the Cold War, rich democracies were reluctant to say or do much about
governments in Africa for fear of driving African countries into the socialist camp." A
case in point was Zaire's government under Mobutu Sese Sekou whose corrupt but
reliable anti-communist regime received American backing. With the disintegration of
the centralist Marxist one-party system of the Soviet Union, foreign aid assistance
policies focused on liberal democratic and economic reforms as the basis for
determining how to allocate aid resources. These political and economic reforms
came to be known as the New Policy Agenda (NPA). These reforms took place in
most of the eastern European and African states. Most notable in Africa is the
collapse of the Marxist regime in Ethiopia and the decision by Mozambican officials
to create a multiparty free-market system.
These policies prescribed less state intervention, while non-governmental
organisations (NGOs hereafter) were viewed by donors as necessary vehicles to
address development problems in Africa. The emergence of NGOs focusing on
welfare and modernisation-oriented activities over the last two decades is thus not a
coincidence. Their role within the neo-liberal framework is to provide social welfare
service in areas, from which the state has withdrawn. In the last twenty years there has
been an unprecedented proliferation of such NGOs. According to Edwards & Hulme
(1996: 3) "By any standards, the 1980s and 1990s have seen an explosion in the
number of non-governmental organisations and grassroots organisations active in
2
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relief and development. The number of development NOOs registered in the OECD
countries of the industrialized North has grown from 1,600 in 1980 to 2,970 in 1993,
and over the same period the total spending of these NOOs has risen from US$ 2.8
billion to US$ 5,7 billion in current prices." In Kenya the increase of non-church
foreign NOOs rose from 37 to 134 during 1978-87 and local NOOs by 115% from 57
to 133. Similarly the number of indigenous NOOs in Botswana increased by 60%
between 1985 and 1989 (Fowler: 1991: 54).
NOOs emerged as a result of a wide variety of very different national traditions of
self-help and outreach programmes (Smillie, 1999: 8). Some originated from
missionary movements that had been established in the sixteenth century. The modem
secular NOOs originated with the creation of the Red Cross in the 1860s. Others are
also a result of wars: Save the Children was established in 1920 after World War I,
Foster Parents Plan during the Spanish Civil war, Oxfam and CARE emerged after
World War II. Itwas only after the 1970s that governments recognised the importance
of NOOs because of their emergency work. By then it was recognised that these
movements had developed certain specialised skills as well. According to Marcussen
(1996: 408), conventional wisdom suggests that the perceived comparative
advantages of NOOs include:
o a capacity to reach the poorest, and outreach to remote areas;
o a capacity to promote local participation and to implement projects in direct
collaboration with target beneficiary groups;
o a capacity to operate at low costs;
o a capacity to be innovative, experimental, adaptable and flexible; and
o a capacity to strengthen local institutions/organisations; to empower
marginal groups.
3
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The assumption behind these perceived comparative advantages was that NGOs could
be innovative and respond quickly, whereas governments could not. At the same time,
as indicated above, it was apparent that the Official Development Assistance (ODA)
geared towards governments in Africa was not having the desired impact. Thus
donors who funded governments in Africa saw these factors as reasons for paying
attention to, and supporting, NGOs.
Thus the increase ofNGOs was partly the result of official aid made available to them.
This phenomenon is summed up by Fowler (1991: 55):
This increase in NGOs can be seen as a resource-led process arising from
greater official aid for them. Disappointed with the performance of aid-
funded projects implemented by governments and current ideology of
comparative advantage which underpins structural adjustment policies
have, in the period 1975-85, justified a 1400% global increase in official
assistance available to NGOs. Today, government finance accounts for one
third of the US$5 bn which Northern NGOs, themselves more than
doubling in number in the 1980s, disburse annually in the South.
1.2 Problem statement
Over the last decade the purpose of foreign aid has been to promote the principles of
the New Policy Agenda (NPA). The nature of foreign financial support during the
1990s differed from that which had preceded it. While during the Cold War era
development assistance was a strategic instrument for influence, during the past
decade it has been employed to advance democracy and liberal market reforms.
South Africa has not remained immune from this. Since 1994 there has also been a
dramatic change in donor funding patterns in South Africa. First, given the delicately
negotiated political transition, the principal purpose of aid was to strengthen and
instutionalise democracy. Secondly, aid was allocated to service provision
programmes given the disparities within the population in terms of income, access to
basic services, health, water and sanitation.
4
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Furthermore, prior to 1994 the flow of ODA to South Africa was allocated directly to
NGOs. The purpose of ODA was to empower those sectors of society that were
opposed to apartheid. After the first democratic elections in 1994, international donors
redirected a large proportion of official aid budgets towards government as the newly
democratic state faced the enormous task of reconstruction and development.
Itwas anticipated that government would serve as the conduit for foreign aid funding.
According to Smith (2002: 3), "One assumption behind donors shifting most of their
funding from NGOs was that some of this funding would find its way back to NGOs,
through government channels" (http://www.nu.ac.za/csds/Publications/donor_9.PDF).
However, since 1994 there has been an absence of an effective state funding
mechanism. The Transitional National Development Trust (TNDT) was established in
1996 as a temporary measure to allocate funds. The National Development Agency
(NDA) replaced it in 2000. Both these institutions proved to be ineffective,
experiencing major backlogs in the disbursement of funds to NGOs. According to
Smith (2002: 3), "Of the R340 million allocated to the agency [NDA] in its first year
of operation, less than one tenth was
(http://www.nu.ac.za/csds/Publications/ donor_9 .PDF).
actually disbursed"
Lastly, prior to 1994 control measures for accounting and spending of funds were not
implemented. However, since 1994 donors have attached various management
requirements to the disbursement of funds. These changes in donor funding patterns
have had a considerable impact on the NGOs and their relations to the state.
1.3 Purpose
This study investigates the dynamics between the state and NGOs under the new
funding environment. It is argued that the redirection of funding towards the new
government and away from NGOs, which have been exclusive recipients of foreign
finding under apartheid, has undermined the independence ofNGOs. These aid trends
undermine NGO independence in that donors earmark service-oriented organisations
and those that promote the values, procedures and overall framework of a liberal
market democracy. The Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) identified
5
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the following: meeting of basic needs; accelerating infrastructure development,
economic growth, development and job creation; human resource development;
safety and security; and transformation of government, as priority sectors for
government spending. NGOs that do not aim to achieve these objectives are not likely
to receive funding. This forces NGOs to adopt strategies, which, among other things
include abandoning their advocacy role.
Lastly, the imposition of control measures for accounting and spending of funds has
had also had a serious impact on NGOs. It is argued that visible, urban-based, formal
NGOs with administrative and research capacity are more likely to receive funding.
Conversely informal rural and peri-urban based NGOs are likely not to receive
funding.
1.4 Research questions
Having outlined the aid trends in South Africa, this study will look at the following
questions: 1) what has the impact been of foreign aid policies on state-NGO relations
since 19947 Following from this, 2) what has the impact been of foreign aid policies
on the role ofNGOs since 19947
1.5 Theoretical framework
1.5.1 The rise of the New Policy Agenda and NGOs in South Africa
Foreign development aid has been used to shape policies of recipient countries and to
advance donor foreign policy objectives, values and objectives they regard as
important. For instance, in 1975 the US congress enacted the Foreign Assistance Act
(1975), which prohibited financial assistance to any country violating internationally
recognised human rights (Crawford: 2001: 11). These laws, however, were ineffective
because they were subject to the USA's foreign policy objectives during the Cold War.
During this period the US government used foreign aid as an instrument to gain the
support of Third World countries. The human rights conditionality clause included in
the Foreign Assistance Act (1975) was undermined in the sense that funds were
sometimes allocated to governments guilty of gross human rights violations for
6
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example, the Philippines, South Korea, Iran and the former Zaire, which were all of
strategic interest to the US. Similarly, centrally planned economies also sought to gain
the support of the Third World. In 1961 about 61 percent of total bilateral aid was
allocated to Vietnam, Cuba, Mongolia and Afghanistan (Mosley: 1987: 29-31). Thus,
in the early stages aid was rarely based on economic and social development needs.
The economic climate during the late 1970s was characterised by the increasing
dependence and the deteriorating international position of developing countries. This
was combined with growing scepticism about the nature and role of governments.
These factors triggered a call from foreign donors for economic policy reform. As
Tjenneland (2000:41) comments: "Programmes were designed to ensure structural
adjustment in crisis-ridden economies in the South, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa.
The new aid objectives were increasingly pursued through [economic reform]
conditionalities. "
Political reforms and democratisation, however, were not initially part of aid
conditionalities. The prevailing wisdom during that era was that authoritarian
governments were more effective in implementing harsh economic adjustment
measures. (Crawford :2001: 13). This had dire implications for developing countries.
Financial assistance was allocated to autocratic governments, who were not
accountable. It also served to enrich politicians and insulated them from popular
demands.
With the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 there was a shift in the policy
orientations of donor governments. Aid conditionality specifically required
commitments to democracy and liberal market reform (Patomaki: 1999: 121). The rise
of democracy and liberal market reform were thus a consequence of the end of the
Cold War. With the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet bloc the West
discontinued support for authoritarian governments. Proponents of these reforms
argue that this approach will ensure that aid is well spent and not misused.
Additionally control mechanisms within the aid programme itself monitor how money
is spent. This combination of democratic and economic reforms has come to be
7
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termed the NPA. The creation of the NPA and the growing number of NGOs is
neither an accident nor a result of a philanthropic agenda or local and voluntary action.
Robinson (1993) argues that the "New Policy Agenda" embodies two basic sets of
beliefs: neo-liberal economics and democratic polity.
First, markets and private initiative are seen as the most efficient mechanisms for
achieving economic growth and providing social services. Governments enable and
facilitate private provision, but they should minimise their direct role in the economy.
Instead NGOs should playa significant role in providing resources. This is because of
their cost effectiveness in reaching the poorest. Thus the expansion of NGOs and the
expansion of the market economy is not a coincidence. The functional purpose of
NGOs in this context is to humanise the adverse effects of the market economy.
Dicklitch (1998: ix) argues that the current fixation on NGOs as vehicles of
empowerment, democratisation and development is reflected in the NPA, which often
sees the state as a facilitator rather than an initiator. Similarly Macdonald (1997: 26)
argues that the structural adjustment programmes of the IMF encourage governments
to cut back on the basic needs of the poor in order to increase export production.
Consequently, structural adjustment affects the poor negatively, because of cut-backs
in social services and subsidised credit, energy prices, or food. This has resulted in the
expansion of NGOs, which are now seen as the preferred channel for service
provision, and thus the role of the state has been deliberately substituted. NGOs are
thought of as possessing a mix of characteristics suited to "humanising" the
implementation of structural adjustment programmes.
Secondly, since the 1990s donors have been preoccupied with the poor 'governance'
in Africa as the root cause of underdevelopment. Donors contend that a sustainable
market economy requires a liberal democratic polity with a strong civil society.
During the 1990s a consensus emerged among policy makers that aid must be
conditional to political reforms. NGOs were viewed as vehicles for democratic
consolidation and essential components of a dynamic civil society. According to
Moore (1993: 27), "These NGOs are supposed to act as a counter-weight to state
8
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power protecting human rights, opening up channels of communication and
participation, providing grounds for activists and promoting pluralism." Therefore the
expansion ofNGGs cannot be separated entirely from the political ideals of the NPA.
In South Africa foreign funding pnor to 1994 was informed by anti-apartheid
concerns. Donors bypassed the state and its agencies and instead allocated aid directly
to NGOs. This financial support began with Denmark in the mid-1960s and was
followed by Norway and Sweden in the 1970s. The Nordic countries were joined by
the EU and the USA, which each provided an unprecedented $340 million to South
African NGOs during the nine-year period before the end of apartheid and the 1994
elections (Hearn: 2000: 317). Under the EU the Special Programme of 1986-1991
funds were allocated through four non-racial and non-governmental bodies, namely
the South African Council of Churches (SACC), the Southern African Catholic
Bishops Conference (SACBC), the Kagiso Trust (KT) and the Trade Unions.
Despite the government's attempts to curb transfer of funds to NGGs (Disclosure of
Foreign Funding Act of 1989) the number of NGOs continued to expand. Walters
(1993: 2) states that "The acceleration of the growth of these organisations reached an
all-time high during the latter part of the 1980s ...." Channelling funds directly towards
NGOs partly facilitated the rapid growth.
1.5.2 Theories of NGO state relations
There are basically three theoretical frameworks that define NGG state relations.
Clarke as quoted in Marcussen (1996: 418) suggests that "...there are basically three
different ways in which NGOs can relate to the state: 1) complementing it, by filling
gaps, providing services, 2) opposing it, either directly or lobbying against it, together
with local groups and in support of locals, and 3) reforming it, working with the
grassroots, helping them raise concerns at state level and working with governments
to improve policies."
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Bratton (1989: 573) argues that "... government NGO relations cannot be understood
without a basic appreciation of the abstract objectives, structures and cultures upon
which each type of organisation is modelled." The primary objective of government is
to maintain political stability. Young as quoted in Fowler (1991) identifies a number
of government objectives, which include maintaining security, autonomy, revenue,
and continued legitimacy. NGOs who are perceived as threatening state authority fall
out of favour or are neutralised.
States perceive their objectives to be threatened under several circumstances: first, the
nature of NGOs activity and programmes; secondly, when NGOs provide
organisational channels through which opposition can be mounted against an
incumbent regime; thirdly, when issues of national sovereignty or state security are
felt to be at stake (for example, in situations when NGOs try to maintain autonomy
from the state through foreign funding). If foreign-funded NGOs provide services,
especially in programmes, which are co-ordinated by the state, tensions are minimal.
On the other hand, the activities of foreign funded NGOs are controversial, for
example, when they criticise the state or mobilise the poor, governments tend to be
antagonistic towards NGOs (Sen: 1999: 330). These NGOs become targets of various
actions by government, which are aimed at constraining their activities. Fowler (1991)
identifies some of these policies:
Legislation. Traditionally governments have enacted laws that regulated the activities
of entities such as political parties and companies. Governments rarely enacted laws
that defined and regulated NGOs. Nevertheless, the growing number of NGOs has
necessitated the introduction of laws to circumscribe their activities. Fowler (1991: 65)
identifies a number of reasons for introducing NGO related legislation: some of the
NGOs are abusing their status; they need to be co-ordinated; they do not relate
correctly to the official system of development administration; donor funds need to be
protected against misuse; and the NGOs pose a security problem.
10
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Political appropriation. Political appropriation is most common in single-party states.
It is characterised by bureaucrats of both NGOs and government sharing the same
ethics and class backgrounds and having undergone the same socialisation. The
sharing of staff between NGOs and state often reinforces this pattern. There are clear
examples of government-run, initiated or inspired NGOs, such as, the Tanzania Youth
and Development Foundation, which is legally a non-governmental organisation, but
senior political and government officials sit on its board of trustees. In South Africa
this is reflected in the relationship between the ruling ANC party and the South
African National Civic Organisation (SANCO). In 1997 Mlungisi Hlongwane,
president of SANCO, declared that "The President of the ANC is a national patron of
SANCO and a card-carrying member of the same organisation. The constituency we
represent overlaps [and we thus] share a common programme of reconstruction and
development and policies fundamental to the objectives and cornerstone of the two
organisation" (http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/prI1997/pr0223.html).Itis therefore
common that high-ranking SANCO officials hold various local government positions.
For example Khabane Khabane, who is a councillor in Bethlehem municipality, is
also a leader of Bohlokong Civic association (City Press: 17 November 2002).
Administrative co-option. Administrative co-optation is aimed at ensuring that the
activities of NGOs are consistent with the national policies of government. Funding
has played a significant role to ensure that this takes place. The progression of
financial aid to NGOs has followed a linear pattern over the years. Smillie (1999: 9)
argued that initially grants came with few strings attached, but were later replaced by
more formalised matching grant programmes. While much of the programme is
designed by the NGO, the organisation has to fulfil at least a few basic government
requirements. This means that governments are setting parameters for where and how
NGOs can perform their activities.
During the heady days of these partnerships, several governments began to offer
NGOs contracts for the management of bilateral programmes and projects. This meant
that NGOs were being encouraged or even required to bid against each other and
against private sector firms if they wanted bilateral contracts. Fowler (1991: 67)
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argues that "This trend is reinforced by official donors who require them (NOOs) to
obtain government approval as a condition for obtaining funds. It is obviously quite
proper for any government or donor to ensure that the activities of organisation in a
country are consistent with their policies."
On the other hand, NOOs attempt to remain autonomous from the state. Some NOOs
tend to be adversarial in nature in the sense that their mission is to mobilise popular
opinion around specific issues (for example, land reforms). Others according to
Bratton (1989: 574), "...explicitly hold political empowerment as an organisational
value and rely on radical analyses of the political economy of poverty and techniques
of awareness raising and conscientisation." Research has shown that representing
local groups to persuade government by constructive engagement to reform state
policies is not a common phenomenon (Marcussen: 1996: 418). NOOs and the
community view the state as part of the problem rather than the solution. (Puplampu
& Wisdom: 2000, Sen: 1999, & Petras: 1999). Accordingly, the NOO-state
relationship is often adversarial, with NOOs attempting to bypass the state. Fowler
(1991) argues that NOOs support of local communities to oppose government has a
negative impact on the legitimacy of the state. Based on evidence from Eastern and
Southern Africa, where sections of the community have been mobilised to counteract
the state, he concludes that this has led to a negative backlash from states.
It is precisely because government and NOOs are functionally differentiated that they
are likely to clash occasionally. Generally, governments will employ policies to
neutralise NOOs. NOOs have, however, also resorted to various strategies to avoid
any form of political appropriation or administrative co-option by the state. As Gary
(1996: 154-155) has observed, these efforts, which include keeping a low profile,
forming NOO associations, relying on international links to provide credibility and
protection, selectively collaborating with governments, and pursuing advocacy, media
work and public education. He argues that in Africa NOOs have resorted to forming
consortia, co-ordinating bodies or umbrella organisations to present a collective voice
to government and international donors and to co-ordinate their activities.
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1.6 Units of analysis
This study will use the definition of the state used by Walters (1993: 1). She defines
the state as encompassing the executive, legislature (parliament), the civil service,
judiciary, police and army: the institutions that make and enforce public policy,
symbolically and in practice. "Government" is generally used merely to signify the
executive branch of the state.
Non-governmental organisations form an important component of civil society. Civil
society is all of society outside of government or the public sphere and outside the
private sphere of family life. Over the years it has come to play an important role in
the field of social development and upliftment. However, there is widespread
disagreement about the term NGO. The lack of a common definition is perhaps also
the result of the nature and types of NGOs. This study will distinguish between two
types of NGOs. First, there are NGOs that focus on the provision of public services.
These NGOs generally enter into contractual agreements with donors and
governments to provide these services. They are broadly referred to as Public Service
Contractors (PSCs). According to Sen (1999: 330) "PSCs are non-profit organisations
that sell their services to aid donors and governments to implement development
programmes. Such NGOs are often driven by the market rather than by the 'values'
and motives that are generally associated with NGOs." The motives and values that
are generally associated with NGOs are rooted in the need to alleviate poverty. This
means that, while the emergence of NGOs is motivated by the goal to meet the
developments needs of people, the emergence of PCSs is motivated by the
development agenda as defined by government and donors.
Conversely, there are NGOs that view under-development as a result of factors such
as inadequate institutions, bad public policies and the powerlessness of the poor.
Thus, for these organisations social progress is attainable through mobilisation, the
creation of social awareness and the provision of social services. These types of
NGOs do not only provide public services, they also act as lobbying and advocacy
groups, and are involved in the formation of alternative public policy (Fowler: 1991:
70). They are clearly distinct autonomous agencies in so far as development strategy
is concerned. These two types ofNGOs will form the focal point of this study.
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1.7 Nature of study
The study relied on secondary data sources that are available in the area of NOO state
relations. These include:
o Articles and books on NOO-state relations,
o Official reports from donors, NOOs, and government,
o Media material (newspapers, editorials and magazines), and
o The Internet.
1.8 Method
Chapter Two will attempt to assess the link between ODA policies and NPA. To
investigate this, the study relied mainly on qualitative data. Information on aid
assistance is sourced from donor reports. The study focuses on the post-1994 period,
because international donor funding policies changed dramatically during this era in
South Africa
The study also focuses on two major donor agencies in South Africa: EU and USAID.
Actual financial contributions from all donor agencies are difficult to estimate
accurately for various reasons. The main reason for this is that much of the financial
information is not available in other reports. In addition, the financial information is
not easy to estimate, given the different currency formats used.
In Chapter Three this study focuses on the impact of ODA on NOO state relations in
South Africa. Sen (1999: 230) states that "The nature of NOO activity and
programmes determines NOO state relations to a great extent." The activities of
NOOs include, complementing government programmes by providing services where
government is unable to provide such services. Secondly, NOOs oppose government
either directly or by lobbying against it, together with local groups and in support of
locals. Thirdly, NOOs can work towards reforming government by working with
grassroots organisations and helping them raise concerns at state the level.
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Conversely, government activities include the evaluation of NGO activities and
supporting them. Secondly, it van oppose NGOs and employ methods to control and
neutralise them through: 1) legislation; 2) bureaucratic regulation, where NGOs must
be registered with one or more government ministries or their activities approved by
government officials; and 3) political appropriation, where governments, politicians,
civil servants and bureaucrats can create their own NGOs. In response to this, NGOs
may employ various means to counter state attempts to control them. These include
keeping a low profile, forming NGO associations, relying on international links to
provide credibility and protection, selectively collaborating with governments,
pursuing policy advocacy, media work and public education. Thus this section
primarily relies on qualitative data.
Furthermore, quantitative data is employed to determine the effect of changes in
foreign aid policies on NGOs. Quantitative data from foreign donors, government
funding mechanisms of South Africa such as the TNDT and the NDA is employed to
demonstrate which NGOs received funding.
The first chapter has provided the mm and scope of the study. Chapter Two
establishes the link between ODA policies and NPA. It further looks at how NGOs
are funded in South Africa. Chapter Three provides a brief history of NGOs in South
Africa. More importantly, this chapter also looks at how ODA funding impacts on
NGO state relations in South Africa. The fourth chapter provides a conclusion and
some recommendations.
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Chapter Two
Foreign Development Assistance in South Africa
2.1 Introduction
The rationale behind policies of international donor agencies prior to 1994 in South
Africa was to empower those agencies and sectors of society that were anti-apartheid
in nature and in intent. The modality of ODA was to bypass the state and fund NGOs
directly, with the management and monitoring of these funds left to the discretion of
the recipients. After 1994 there were changes in the political landscape of South
Africa. These changes were also paralleled by changes in donor community
orientations about the purpose and intent of ODA. These changes significantly
influenced ODA policies.
This chapter focuses on the ODA policies in South Africa between 1994 and 1999. It
is argued that the purpose and the intent of ODA policies are to advance the NPA.
Firstly, much of the foreign donor policies are aimed at supporting government liberal
market policies and instruments in the form of the Growth, Employment and
Redistribution (GEAR) strategy and the RDP White Paper. Secondly, they are aimed
at supporting the national development strategy for the alleviation of poverty. The
national development strategies are captured in both the RDP White Paper and the
Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF).
Following the 1994 elections international donors worked largely with South African
government. NGOs receive funds when they demonstrate that they are able to work in
partnership with government. Thus, government established the development finance
agency, the Transitional National Development Trust (TNDT), later replaced by the
National Development Agency (NDA), which is part of the national development
strategy for the alleviation of poverty. These institutions support organisations of civil
society in their efforts to promote sustainable, people-centred development.
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Lastly, foreign donor policies supported the democratic consolidation process despite
the government's lack of a framework for informing democracy and good governance
(D&GG). Given the government's lack of such a framework to inform D&GG
foreign donors developed their own programmes for democratic assistance.
2.2 ODA policies in South Africa before 1994
The task of understanding the nature of international development assistance under
the apartheid government should be approached with caution. Given the political
environment prior to 1994, modalities for effective management were absent, with
most recipients (particularly NGOs) enjoying the freedom to allocate and spend funds
at their discretion and to maintain the transactions of these activities in non-
transparent ways in order to avoid scrutiny by the apartheid state. Although there
have been attempts to understand the nature of the relationship between donors and
NGOs, little is known about the exact nature and extent of funding to NGOs in that
period. International development assistance during this period focused primarily on
victims of apartheid. Bratton and Landsberg (1999) argue that much of pre-transition
aid was spent outside the country in the form of assistance to the exiled liberation
movements, or through a worldwide airlift of black South African students to
overseas educational institutions (http://www.cps.org.za/execsumm/rr62.htm).
The Constructive Engagement Policy (CEP) of the USA is an example of this. Funds
were allocated to various sectors of the black communities in South Africa.
According to Seidman (1984: 107), USAID committed aid to four areas in the pre-
1994 period: $4 million a year for scholarships to bring approximately 100 black
South Africans students to the United States for undergraduate and graduate studies,
mainly in the area of science; more than $1 million in 1983-4 to train South African
labour leaders (funds provided in co-operation with the AFL-CIO African-American
Labour Centre); a $5 million programme, implemented through private South African
institutions, to provide scholarships for some 4000 black South African students each
year; $3 million from 1985 to 1986 to support small businesses, a project
administered in co-operation with the National Federated Chamber of Commerce in
South Africa.
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Similarly to the USA CEP, the EU developed a "Special programme for victims of
Apartheid" implemented within the framework of the "twin track" policy. The
establishment of this programme was a result of the 1984-1985 outbreak of popular
unrest in South Africa, culminating in the imposition of a state of emergency. This
programme, which provided support to local NGOs, bypassed the state (Grassia:
1996: 139).
During this period the principal recipient of international development assistance
were NGOs. Bratton and Landsberg (1999) state that "Foreign aid during this era was
allocated through NGOs and community-based organisations (CBOs), which ran
grass roots projects" (http://www.cps.org.za/execsumm/rr62.htm). International
donors relied on national NGOs such as KT to transfer funds. KT was not linked to
particular community constituencies but rather funded local activities or provided
technical assistance to CBOs. Bollens (2000: 170) states that KT "was a critical
conduit during the apartheid years for European Union Special Programme money
targeted at grassroots efforts [to address] unemployment, housing, and social
empowerment." Furthermore, he posits that, since its inception, KT has invested over
R750 million in community projects.
2.3 Factors influencing donor policies in South Africa after 1994
After the 1994 elections in South Africa there were dramatic changes in the terms of
donor policy orientations. The changing political and economic environment globally
and locally precipitated these reforms. Firstly, after the fall of the Berlin Wall there
was a general agreement that development co-operation should be conditional on the
implementation of democratic reforms. According to Crawford (2001: 4) "The issue
of a rapid succession of policy statements making democratic reform both an
objective and a condition of development co-operation commenced shortly after the
fall of the Berlin Wall." The British and French governments were the first to declare
this objective followed by the German government in 1991, then the Nordic
countries, the Netherlands and Canada. International bodies such as the Development
Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD also prioritised participatory
development and good governance during the 1990s (Crawford: 2001: 4-5). The
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rationale behind this policy orientation was to "ensure greater direct impact of ODA
[and] to synchronise the structure and outputs of ODA with the development agenda
of recipient countries" (Development Cooperation Report II (DCR II)
(http://www.finance.gov.za/documents/dcr/odadb.pdf).
Secondly, the end of apartheid in South Africa necessitated the normalisation of the
relationship between the donor community and South Africa. South Africa was no
longer viewed as the pariah state but was seen "to be representative of the needs and
aspirations of the South African people, and therefore to be considered as an ally and
significant partner - and not an obstacle - in the directing and management of donor
funding" (DCR II: http://www.finance.gov.za/documents/dcr/odadb.pdf).
Thirdly, the demise of the apartheid state and the installation of a democratic state
meant that the international donor community needed to consider both the
developmental requirements of the country as well as its requirements in a critical
period of transition. In South Africa significant disparities exist within the population
in terms of income, access to basic services, education, health, water and sanitation,
and the overall quality of life. Notwithstanding its strength as an economic and
political power on the continent, South Africa is ranked lower than many developing
countries on the Human Development Index (the HDI is an index derived from the
GDP per capita, education and literacy levels, and life expectancy). The UN Human
Development Report of 1999 revealed that, despite being ranked tenth out of 93
countries in the Medium Human Development category in terms of real GDP per
capita, the country is ranked ss" on the HDI.
Cognisant of the development challenges confronting it, the South African
government itself undertook a programme to define and implement its development
agenda. Firstly, the ANC, which was the government in waiting, developed the
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) as a measure to achieve its
goals. Originally, the broad vision of RDP was to ensure growth and development
through reconstruction and redistribution and sought a leading and enabling role for
government in guiding the mixed economy. The RDP policy document of the ANC
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states that "The RDP links reconstruction and development in a process that will lead
to growth in all parts of the economy, greater equity through redistribution, and
sustainability [and] ... that neither a commandist central planning system nor an
unfettered free market system can provide adequate solutions to the problems
confronting [South Africa]. Reconstruction and development will be achieved
through the leading and enabling role of the state, a thriving private sector, and active
involvement by all sectors of civil society, which in combination will lead to
sustainable growth" (http://www.polity.org.za/html/govdocs/rdp/rdp2.html#2.2).
This was in direct contrast with the neo-liberal economic framework, which
emphasises growth first and redistribution later and less government intervention in
the economy. Thus international donor agencies were concerned about the RDP
objectives. For example Padayachee (1994: 587-589) argued that the IMF was
primarily concerned with the maintenance of macroeconomic balance and financial
discipline and these concerns were at odds with the objectives of the RDP.
Tjonneland as quoted in Padayachee (1994: 589) states that "the basic message
emerging from the IMF recommendations may be summed as growth first and
redistribution later."
The release of the RDP White Paper in September 1994 signified the first major point
of departure from both the goals and objectives of the initial RDP document. The
government began to adopt the tenets of the neo-liberal framework. According to the
National Institute of Economic policy (1996: 1), "the White Paper transformed the
role of fiscal prudence from a means to achieve RDP objectives to an objective of the
RDP; the goal of redistribution was dropped as a main objective; and the government
role in the economy was reduced to the task of managing the transformation."
The introduction of GEAR in 1996 consolidated the acceptance of the neo-liberal
framework and its policies. GEAR's point of departure is that growth in South Africa
will require the establishment of an outward economy (GEAR: 1996: 1). This strategy
strives to accelerate growth by increasing the amount of goods and services that are
exported. Government trade policies as outlined in GEAR included: replacement of
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former quantitative restrictions on tariffs; rationalisation of the tariff structure by
almost halving the number of tariff lines; abolition of import surcharges and phasing
down tariffs (on average by one third over five years); and phasing out of the general
export incentives scheme (GEAR: 1996: 12-13). This is in contrast with the RDP,
which emphasised redistribution of wealth as the major driver of economic growth.
GEAR asserts that the fiscal situation that had developed by 1992/93 was
unsustainable. Therefore the key objective of the macro-economic strategy was to
reduce the fiscal deficit rapidly by cutting government expenditure. The GEAR
document (1996:5) states that "government consumption expenditure should be cut
back, private and public sector wage increases kept in check, tariff reform accelerated
to compensate for the depreciation and domestic savings performance improved".
Thus in the 1997/98 budget the Minister of Finance initiated a thorough audit of
government expenditure, including RDP allocations to identify those areas in which
budgetary cuts could be made (GEAR: 1996: 8). The government expenditure
cutbacks had serious implications with regard to the RDP objectives. The
implementation of tight fiscal policies meant cutbacks on RDP objectives to improve
the provision of social services and infrastructural development. Given the country's
need for radical improvements in social services and infrastructural development, the
stated objectives of the macroeconomic strategy to reduce government spending
implied reliance on the private sector for the delivery of services and infrastructure
development.
Thus the National Institute for Economic Policy (NIEP) concludes that (1994: 23):
Despite the Document's claim that the proposed scenario is an 'integrated'
scenario, one striking feature of the Document is the lack of integration between
various issues under discussion and how they may impact upon one another. For
example, the framework treats redistribution as an outcome of growth and does
not consider the direct effects of redistribution on growth and employment; it does
not integrate into the proposed scenario the growth, employment and income
distribution effects of restructuring government expenditures. Moreover, the
proposed integrated scenario suffers from policies that tend to work
antagonistically.
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Government further introduced the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF)
to achieve its goals. MTEF is a multi-annual budgeting system that covers three years
instead of the usual one. MTEF provides the outline of priority areas for funding.
According to the DeR II, the 1998 Budget Review listed the following as the
priorities of the MTEF:
• Meeting basic needs - principally in education, health, water and sanitation,
social services, welfare, land reform and housing;
• Accelerating infrastructure development ensunng investment In
infrastructure, upgrading of roads, undertaking of spatial development
initiatives (SDIs), and addressing urban renewal principally via public
partnership;
• Economic growth, development and job creation - the stimulated building of
the economy to achieve sustainable, accelerated growth with correspondent
redistribution in opportunities and income;
• Human resource development - the education and training of citizens in pre-
primary formative, tertiary, technical institution and lifelong education and
training for adults, the unemployed and out-of-school children;
• Safety and security - the transformation of the criminal justice, police and
prisons administration and the improvement in the national defence and
disaster management;
• Transformation of government - the strengthening of administration and good
governance and the implementation of a code of conduct (Batho Pele - People
first) for service delivery by the public service
(http://www.finance.gov.za/documents/dcr/evaluations.pdf).
International donor agencies worked according to the stated neo-liberal policies as set
out in GEAR and RDP White Paper policies and MTEF priorities to determine their
development programmes as shall be shown below.
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2.4 Donor policies in South Africa
The EU-South Africa development agreements resemble the national development
policies adopted by the South African government. The EU Multi-Annual Indicative
Programme (MIP), a development package to support South Africa's development
programme was developed in accordance with MTEF priorities. According to MIP,
the first criterion to identify specific interventions to be funded is that the programme
must be consistent with key priorities in the MTEF. Out of the criteria that were used
to identify specific interventions, the following three key policies emerged:
• Private sector development with the focus on improvement of internal and
external competitiveness;
• poverty reduction through improved social service delivery with focus on
water and sanitation, health and housing, and through the stimulation of local
economic development;
• consolidation of democracy through increased awareness and the promotion
of human rights and improved law enforcement (MIP: 1996: 3).
Similarly, USAID-South Africa's strategy (1996-2002) was also developed in
consultation with South African government policies and focused on the following
six development objectives: democratic consolidation; increased access to quality
education and training; increased use of primary health services and HIV/AIDS
prevention/mitigation practices; improved capacity to formulate, evaluate and
implement economic policy; increased market-driven employment opportunities; and
increased access to shelter and environmentally sound municipal services
(http://www.sn.apc.org/usaidsa/budget.html).
To ensure private sector development the government's macroeconormc policy
GEAR envisaged the promotion of small, medium and micro enterprises (SMMEs).
This strategy was viewed as measure to ensure economic growth, employment
creation and income generation (GEAR: 1996:14). The EU and USAID have
provided support for programmes related to this policy objective.
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According to MIP (2000: 11):
The overall objective of private sector support is to contribute to South Africa's
efforts for increased competitiveness and sustainable economic growth given the
changing environment at the global leve!.... European community support will
aim, in particular, at the development of SMMEs in order to promote sustainable
income generating and employment creation opportunities.
Support was therefore provided for various government programmes and institutions
that were established to ensure the development of SMMEs. This includes support for
Khula Enterprise, Ntsika Enterprise, the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC)
and the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) development programme. Khula was
designed to provide financial services so as to increase the capacity of emerging or
established SMMEs. Ntsika provides a complementary service by offering SMMEs
non-financial support such as training and capacity building. In addition, the IDC is
mandated to provide support to small and medium enterprises (SMMEs) in the
manufacturing sector. Lastly, the DTI initiative aims at promoting the development of
the SMME sector in order to streamline their functioning and maximise their impact.
According to MIP (2000: 12):
Under the previous MIP (1996-1999), private sector development, especially
through support to SMMEs, was identified as a priority area. Consequently
institutional and financial support has been deployed through Khula and Ntsika,
as well as to financial intermediaries active in the SMME sector. Moreover,
technology and entrepreneurship training support is being provided to small and
micro enterprises. Last but not least, policy support is given to the Department of
Trade and Industry through training, research and capacity building
(http://europa. eu .inticomml devel opment/nip/za _en. pdf).
Similarly to the MIP, USAID launched a strategy to increase market-driven
employment opportunities in South Africa. This programme basically promotes the
growth of non-agricultural small, medium and micro enterprises (SMMEs) in urban
and peri-urban areas and the growth of small-scale agribusinesses in rural areas. The
programme incorporates the following elements: identification of markets for
SMMEs, primarily through domestic and international linkages; development of
SMME capacity to capitalise on market opportunities through improved business and
entrepreneurial skills, introduction of value added technologies, more efficient use of
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sources
publicly-owned resources; and identification of potential loan and equity capital
and equity investmentsand of loansthe faci litation
(http://www.sn. ape. org/usaidsa/uss05 .html).
Support for programmes and institutions that have been created to ensure the
development of SMMEs provides evidence, which illustrates that international donor
agencies regarded markets and private initiative as the most efficient mechanisms for
achieving economic growth and addressing poverty. This is the first basic tenant of
the NPA.
Furthermore, both the EU and USAID have provided support for programmes related
to social delivery. The largest component of EU fund resources was allocated to the
poverty reduction programmes. The main objectives of the EU's poverty reduction
programme is to support the implementation of priority policies and strategies of the
government aimed at improving the delivery of social services and employment
creation as envisaged in the MTEF (MIP: 1996: 6). Support mainly focused on the
sectors of water and sanitation, health, social housing and local economic
development. Figure 1 shows that 60% of the total resources allocated were
committed to the delivery of social services.
Figure 1: 1997-1999 Multi-annual Indicative Programme
o Social delivery
• Private Sector
Development
DGood
Governance &
Dem oe ratis ation
www.eusa.org.za/content/development/theERPD.html( 12/1 012002)
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Furthermore, between 40% and 50% of the resources allocated to social delivery were
allocated to education and training, and health. Under the education and training
programme resources were also allocated to a range of projects including the Labour
Market Skills Training; projects supporting the South African Qualifications
Authority; Khuphuka Skills Training and Employment Programme; Public Service
Management Development Programme; and the Education Sector Support
Programme (www.eusa.org.za/content/development/theERPD.html).
The government introduced the Public Health Sector Support Programme (PHSSP),
which lasted from 1997 to 1999. During this period health issues were largely
dominated by debates regarding the approach to the prevention and treatment as well
as minimising the impact ofHIV/AIDS in South Africa. Thus the activities funded by
the EU In the health sector all had some focus on HIV/AIDS
(http://www.eusa.org.za/Content/Development/AnnuaIReport2001.html).
Similarly, the USAID social delivery strategy in South Africa has primarily focused
on education programmes. The programme's objective is to achieve improved
primary education; increased access to market-oriented training and improving the
quality of higher education. About US$ 387.3 million had been allocated to the
education programme between the years 1994 to 1999. The democracy and
governance programme (US$ 273 million) is the second largest funded programme
followed by the housing and urban development programme (US$ 266 million), the
private sector development programme (US$ 133 million), health programmes (US$
71.0 million) and the economic capacity programme (US$30 million)
(http://www.sn.apc.org/usaidsalbudget.html).
Under the housing and urban development programme, USAID's goal is to improve
access to sustainable shelter and services for the disadvantaged population. This is to
be achieved through: support for the development of policies conducive to good
management and leveraging of resources; providing technical assistance to increase
the management capacity of local authorities; providing technical assistance and
training to non-governmental organisations and the private sector to enhance their
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partnerships with government in the finance and delivery of environmentally sound
municipal services; and, using the Development Credit Authority (DCA) programme
and alliances to leverage
(http://www.sn.apc. org/usai dsa/uss06 .html).
private sector resources
Health and HIV/AIDS prevention/mitigation is also one of the key focus areas of the
USAID development co-operation strategy. According to USAID, "The rationale for
supporting the development of an integrated primary health care system rather than
the delivery of specific health service is based on RSA's identification of such a
system as the cornerstone of its new health system." To this end USAID's programme
in South Africa will increase access to an integrated package of primary health care;
will improve the quality of services; and will strengthen the capacity of institutions to
provide services in a sustainable manner. USAID also collaborates with the South
Africa government to mitigate the negative public health consequences of HIV/AIDS.
In order to implement this programme the South African government and USATD
have established the "EQUITY" project, which focuses its resources on the Eastern
Cape Province, and an HIV/AIDS project
(http://www.sn.apc.org/usaidsa/budget.html).
Provision of basic social service is directly linked to the NPA. Given the extreme
social inequalities that exist in South Africa and the adverse effects that might be
brought about by the GEAR strategy to reduce the fiscal deficit rapidly by cutting
government expenditure, there was a clear need to support programmes related to the
provision of basic health, education, and security. Provision of these services is aimed
at capacity building and will thus ensure a self-reliant development. In other words'
improving the quality of life of the poor is also a source of social stability and
industrial productivity.
Foreign donor policies supported the democratic consolidation process despite the
government's lack of a framework to inform democracy and good governance
(D&GG). The RDP, particularly in the immediate post-1994 period, was a
government blueprint to democratise the state and society. lts vision was to ensure
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that state power would be democratised to enable the government to "unleash the
resources, neglected skills and stunted potential"
(http://www.polity.org.za/htmllgovdocs/rdp/rdp5.html#5.!). According to this
document, democratisation meant the expansion of equal citizenship rights and
enfranchisement of those who were disenfranchised. Additionally deepening
democracy would require elected government structures that could conduct
themselves in an efficient, effective, responsive, transparent and accountable fashion.
The defence force, police and intelligence services would also be transformed from
being agents of oppression into effective servants of society
(http://www.polity.org.zalhtmllgovdocs/rdp/rdp5 .html#5.1).
The democratic order envisaged by the RDP document would also foster a wide range
of institutions of participatory democracy in partnership with civil society on the basis
of informed and empowered citizens. Institutions such as people's forums, referenda
where appropriate and other consultation processes should be created to facilitate
direct democracy. There was, therefore, a focus on the enhancement of capacity of
civil society organisations and CBOs. These organisations were viewed as important
role players in the democratisation of society. Ensuring gender equity was another
important component in the overall democratisation process. The document envisaged
special attention to the empowerment of women, particularly black rural women.
Since the demise of the RDP ministry, the autonomous development of policies by
various departments and the nature of South Africa's common strategy for Democracy
and Good Governance (D&GG) have become less clear. According to DCR II on
D&GG "This is reflected in the apparent duplication of functions and contradictions
in policy that are witnessed between line departments. For example, the Department
of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG), Department of Finance and the
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) produce legislation impacting on
local authorities. Conflicting approaches to tariff setting and varying approaches to
decentralisation are just two instances of such contradictions"
(http://www.finance.gov.za/documents/dcr/dgg.pdt).This poses a challenge as to how
to shape policies that will improve democracy and governance.
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Donors have responded to this by developing their own programmes for democratic
assistance. According to the DCR II on D&GG, donors have developed four principal
approaches: thematic or sectoral, programmatic or responsive. The thematic approach
means that donors view D&GG "as being cross-cutting issues that impact on their
entire programme with the South African government", whilst the sectoral approach
views D&GG "as a specific sector of funding, with clearly defined areas of focus and
expected outputs" (http://www.finance.gov.za/documents/dcr/dgg.pdf).
In addition, donors allocated funds to D&GG in either a programmatic or generally
responsive (ad hoc) fashion. The programmatic approach outlines well thought
through plans of action, with defined areas of focus. Conversely the responsive or ad
hoc approach is reflected by a preference to provide assistance in reaction to the
South African government requests for specific project.
(http://www.finance.gov.za/documents/dcr/dgg.pdf). Table 2.1 outlines some of the
approaches adopted by donor agencies.
Prior to 1994, in order to assist the transition from apartheid, USAID provided
support to NGOs that were serving the disenfranchised in the areas of human rights,
community and leadership development, and conflict resolution. During the run up to
the 1994 elections USAID provided significant support for election administration
and for voter education. According to Brent (1994: 48), "In preparation for the history
making elections in April 1994, USAID provided $35 million in support of the
electoral process in South Africa."
Voter education formed an integral part of USAID efforts and most of it was provided
by NGOs. USAID focused on voters most likely to be victimised by intimidation,
coercion and fraud, such as the illiterate voter, farm workers, women, disaffected
youth, and voters in especially conservative and violence prone areas. It is estimated
that USAID funded NGOs reached 3.6 million eligible voters by the time of the
elections (Brent: 1994: 48)
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Table 2.1: Approaches adopted by donors in the D&GG arena in South Africa
Donor Cross Sectoral Programmatic Responsive Description
cutting
AusAid ./ The nature of the Ausaid programme (primarily short-term TA exchanges) means that it
is overwhelmingly responsive to the needs of the SA government departments and
institutions that approach the agency. AusAid's attempts to facilitate maximum contact
between South African and Australian institutions in order to bring Australian Best
practice into the South African context. The agency has therefore provided support to
between 25 and 30 government department or institutions .
DFID ./ ./ ./ DFID sees funding in the arena ofD&GG as being both cross-cutting and sectoral. While
having a specific governance programme, the agency also ensures governance
components are built into other programmatic areas. What has been integrated into
governance programme is the cross-cutting issue of poverty reduction. Since the Labour
government came into office in 1997, DIFD has adopted overtly 'pro-poor' development
aid policies and strategies. A key component of this is the is the establishment of political
systems that 'provide opportunities' for the poor and disadvantaged. (DFID Target
Strategy Paper, pg 6). In the South African context, this poverty reduction approach is
integrated into most of the individual departmental governance programs, by, for
example including support for poverty studies and the improvement of services
specifically for poor people.
EU ./ ./ The EU has a largely sectoral approach to funding and has focused its involvement in the
sector around the consolidation of democracy. In terms of its new three-year Indicative
Programme, the primary objective is to promote awareness and effective respect of
political and socio-economic rights as reflected in the Constitution and to improve law
enforcement mechanisms. Within the context of the MIP, the EU has identified a number
of specific programmes, such as the Parliamentary Support Programme and the
Management Development Programme which then provide support to particular areas.
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Cross Sectoral Programmatic Responsive Description
cutting
Netherlands ./ ./ The Netherlands views its engagement with SA as primarily responsive although it has identified
Democracy and Good Government as being one of four priority sectors and Justice as the key issue
within the sector. Justice now receives exclusive support from the agency. In general, the bilateral
Programme makes a contribution to particular government programmes rather than specific projects.
Government can decide which of its projects it would like to put the funding into .
NORAD ./ NORAD has developed a very specific programme focused on support to local government. The
agency does not have a broader programmatic approach to D&GG as a whole .
Sida ./ ./ ./ Sida has increasingly moved towards a more programmatic approach to funding in D&GG. Prior to
1999, the sector was divided into two areas: Public Administration and Human Rights and
Democracy. Civil society support has been linked largely to local and/or grassroots initiatives, whilst
bilateral support has mainly taken the form of inter-institutional linkages, (twinning arrangements
with counterpart Swedish institutions) and placement of Swedish technical expertise in public sector
settings. Since 1999 these two areas have been integrated to form a single sector Programme on
Democratic Governance, with the number of funded projects reduced from 30 to 25. The newly
consolidated Programme has also streamlined its focus, now narrowed down to four 'clusters of
support' .
UNDP ./ The UNDP has a programmatic approach to funding which is informed by its international approach
to tackling poverty reduction, including:
• Livelihood and Employment Creation (establishing the conditions for people to improve
their situations in a sustainable fashion)
• Good Governance (creating an enabling institutional environment that is able to manage
resource distribution)
Programmes have been developed with, among others, DPLG and Department of Safety and
Security.
Source: DRC II on the Evaluation ofODA to D&GG (http://www.finance.gov.za/documents/dcr/dgg.pdf)
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USAID also supported the development of training materials for elections monitors
and development of standards of conduct and criteria by which to judge free and fair
elections. After the 1994 elections USAID embarked on other programmes aimed at
consolidating democracy. The following table indicates some of the project's
implemented by USAID.
Table 2.2: Democracy and Governance Project Data Sheet
PROJECT NAME START DATE END DATE AUTHORISED
FUNDING (MILLION)
Democratic
institutional 1997 2002 $98.7
strengthening
Labour union 1983 1997 $ 25.0
training
Community
outreach leadership 1986 2001 $ 149.3
development
http://www.sn.apc.org/usaidsa/budget.html( 17/02/2003)
USAID supports the consolidation of democratic governance in South Africa through
targeted assistance. It seeks to strengthen democracy through three focus areas. The
first is to achieve a more effective and accessible criminal justice system. Under this
programme USAID worked in close collaboration with the Ministry and Department
of Justice (DoJ), their National Prosecuting Authority (NPA), other specialised justice
institutions linked to the Ministry, and selected NGOs in carrying out a closely
integrated, geographically focused criminal justice programme consisting of four
elements: improved management of justice sector institutions; improved case
processing and efficiency; implementing selected crime and violence prevention
strategies; and better prosecutor-led criminal investigations
(http://www.sn.apc.org/usaidsa/progobjectl.html).
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Second, in September 1998 USAID signed a bilateral agreement with the Ministry
and Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG) for a programme to
assist in establishing a democratic local government system. The programme provides
assistance through three mutually supporting elements: strengthened policies and
programmes that enable effective and democratic local governance; to support local
governments to perform their functions with increasing effectiveness, transparency
and accountability; and to support citizens to exercise their rights and meet their
obligations to local government (http://www.sn.apc.org/usaidsaiprogobjectI.html).
Lastly, building a strategic civil society organisation (CSO)/government partnership
to improve policy development and service delivery. This programme includes:
creating an enabling environment for CSO development; improving the capacity of
CSO to form an effective partnership for development with government; and
strengthening research and dissemination of skills on a broader range of topics related
to civil society and its role m democratic consolidation
(http://www.sn.apc.org/usaidsa/progobject l.html).
Since 1994 EU objectives on democracy and governance have been outlined in the
European Commission (EC) on co-operation with South Africa and adopted by the
European Council and Parliament, and is linked to the objectives and priorities of EC
aid policies as represented in Art. 139 w of the Treaty on the European Union and in
Chapter 1 art.2.2 (a, b) of Council Regulation 975/1999. According to the European
Programme for Reconstruction and Development (ERPD) 2001, report "The
Commission defined its policies and areas of intervention in three mam
communications presented to the Council and Parliament: in 1995 COM 567 of
22/11/95; in OJ C97 of 31 March 1998 and 2001 COM (252) of 8/5/2001".
(http://www.eusa.org.zalContentlDevelopmenti AnnuaiReport200 l.html),
documents entailed the following:
• Supporting the transition to democracy;
• promoting and strengthening the rule of law by supporting parliamentary
These
activities; strengthening the judiciary (exercise of justice, treatment of
offenders, crime prevention); legal assistance aimed at protecting civil and
political freedoms; support for government bodies for the defence and
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promotion of human rights; transparency of public administration at national
and local level;
• promoting a pluralist civil society by promoting the independence, pluralism
and responsibility of the media, freedom of expression and strengthening civil
society;
• human rights education and public awareness (development of teaching,
research and education);
• promoting transparency, good governance and campaigns against corruption;
• support for conflict prevention and peace building; and
• initiatives for target groups needing specific protection or attention such as
children, indigenous people, migrants, refugees and displaced people, victims
of torture, women and some professions such as journalists and security sector
and legal personnel.
(http://www.eusa.org.za/Content/Development/ AnnuaiReport200 l.html)
The EU has thus played a pivotal role in human rights awareness and protection, and
the consolidation of the rule of law mainly through its support to the EU Foundation
for Human Rights (FHR). Although funded by the EU and directed by the EU
appointee, the FHR is established as a fully independent entity. The foundation was
set up with a view to ensuring the responsiveness of the new SA public institution;
contributing to the redress in inequity of access to basic rights and services;
strengthening and encouraging the NGO sector in its watchdog function and
promoting human rights awareness. Thus the FHR's primarily concerns itself with the
functioning of the Chapter Nine institutions such as the Human Rights Commission
and ensuring that the constitutional principles are carried through to all aspects of
legislation and practice (http://www.finance.gov.za/documents/dcr/dgg.pdf).
The EU has also supported the South African government in its efforts to deal with
the high levels of crime and violence. In this regard the EU committed itself to
assisting the government in achieving its objectives as set out in the White Papers on
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Safety and Security, the Crime Prevention Strategy and Justice Vision 2000.
According to MIP (2000. 15), in the field of law the EU aimed to "provide support for
a more effective judiciary system through capacity building and improved functioning
of the judiciary system at all levels. Particular emphasis was placed on the
improvement of Court Management" (http://europa.eu.intlcommldevelopmentlnip/za).
Other programmes include supporting NGOs such as the Institute for Democracy in
South Africa (IDASA) and the Democracy and Good Governance at Local Level
Programme in KwaZulu Natal, which has provided extensive training to local
government councillors, and traditional and civil society leaders. This initiative aims
to promote better dialogue between local government and civil society and facilitate
increased public participation in democratic processes. Transparency South Africa
received funds to promote good governance in the public and private sector and civil
society by conducting research, public education and advocacy related to anti-
corruption initiatives. The South African Labour Development Trust also continued to
receive support to improve the capacity of the trade union federations, their affiliates,
union membership and organised labour at large. The main aim is to support the
labour movement to address macro-economic and policy issues, to build their internal
capacity, improve their collective bargaining capacity and to address discrimination,
inequality and other Issues which affect their members
(http://www.eusa.org.za/Content/Development/ AnnuaiReport200 l.html).
International donor assistance aimed at strengthening the capacity of departments
such as public works, justice, safety and security, provincial and local government,
and statutory bodies such as the Human Rights Commission, Independent electoral
Commission and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission are measures to ensure
liberal democratic polity. This evidence shows that international donor agencies
viewed a liberal democratic polity as essential in ensuring a sustainable market
economy (the second tenet of the NPA). Both private initiative and the strengthening
of democracy form the integral part of their programmes.
35
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
2.5 ODA institutional recipients
Although, prior to the 1994 elections NGOs were recipients of international
development assistance, during the post-1994 period foreign donors redirected
funding towards the new government. Seekings states that:
The European Union, to take one example, decided in 1994 to allocate 25
percent of its funds to NGOs (and CBOs) directly, giving 75 percent of its funds
to the state (although this includes funds to the Transitional National
Development Trust and prospective National Development Agency, for
allocation to NGOs and CBOs). In October 1994 it signed an agreement with the
new South African government to fund a European Programme for
Reconstruction and Development. USAID similarly signed agreements entailing
huge aid packages (http://www.nu.ac.za/csds/Publications/donor_19.PDF).
This was a drastic shift from the pre-election period where much of the funding was
allocated to NGOs. In this new context a large component of foreign funding that had
been channeled directly to NGOs was primarily disbursed to those NGOs that have
similar ideologies and understanding of democracy i.e Western conception of
democracy. Put in other words, both the major donors such as USAID and EU sought
to build civil society organisations in ways that would help steer South Africa's new
democracy in the directions of the NPA. According to Hearn (2000: 827), the six most
(directly) funded NGOs include: Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA),
which is fully committed to procedural democracy; the Institute for Multi-Party
Democracy, whose name is indicative of procedural democracy; the Helen Suzman
Foundation, which undertakes similar democracy surveys to those of IDASA; the
Khulekeni Institute for Democracy, aimed at bringing Parliament closer to the people;
the Electoral Institute of South Africa (EISA), which deals with key aspect of
procedural democracy; and the South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR),
which has a foreign donor-funded Free Society project which aims to monitor South
Africa's democratic development and to promote the rule of law, ethics, justice and
economic freedom.
In this context the government became the conduit for foreign donors' financial
assistance targeted at NGO service delivery. However, government lacked the
capacity to disburse funds. According to the Advisory Committee Report on
structural relations between government and civil society organisations (1997: 9), in
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the period immediately after 1994 the "Government found it to difficult to organise
itself in such a way as to efficiently utilise foreign funding, made available from the
EU and other donors." This was as a result of a shortage of skilled personnel in
development planning and management of government projects and effective funding
mechanisms.
Thus, the Transitional National Development Trust (TNDT) was established in
October 1995 as an interim measure to fund NGOs, while government investigated a
long-term mechanism for disbursing fund to NGOs. Its mandate was that it should
serve as an interim development finance agency that works as part of the national
development strategy for poverty alleviation. It does this by supporting organisations
of civil society in their efforts to promote sustainable, people-centred development.
The TNDT's Board of Trustees was made up of representatives from the CBO
Network, government, the IDT, Nedlac, Kagiso Trust and the South African NGO
Coalition (http://www.tndt.org.za/profile.htm).
The TNDT profile indicates that its funding criteria were in line with the RDP policy
(http://www.tndt.org.za/profile.htm). The RDP White Paper promised a democratic
society that would unleash the economic potential of the country in order to develop
its human resources and expand the provision of basic needs to the majority who have
been systematically deprived. According to the RDP White Paper, the following are
its priority sectors: first, the development of human resources through education and
training, arts and culture, sport and recreation, and youth development; secondly
meeting the basic needs of the South African population in an integrated manner,
through job creation through public works programmes, and the provision of a variety
of basic needs: land reform; housing and services; water and sanitation; energy and
electrification; telecommunications; transport; environment; nutrition; health care;
social security and social welfare; thirdly, to democratise the state to ensure
meaningful participation of the majority, modernisation of structures and functions of
government in pursuit of the objectives of efficient, effective, responsive, transparent
and accountable government (http://www.polity.org.za/html/govdocs/rdp/html#2.1).
All of the six TNDT's priority sectors resemble the government development
objectives. The following table indicates funds allocated by sector from 1996 to 1997.
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Table 2.3: TNDT Sector Allocation since 1996-1997
Sector 0/0
Education & training 50%
Health 16%
SMME 16%
Rural Development 10%
Good Governance & Democracy 5%
Special Programmes 2%
Urban development 1%
http://www.tndt.org.za/anrep99/agraphs.html#sector (26102/2003)
However, the TNDT experienced extreme difficulties in conducting its business. The
Advisory Committee Report (1997 :32) indicates that:
Some of the difficulties included conflict of interest among the stakeholders in its
decision making structures, delays in remittances by the government and the EU,
staff recruitment difficulties and differences in organisation culture between lOT
and KT. The latter led to the untimely withdrawal of participation by the lOT in
this process.
These institutional problems created a major backlog in the disbursement of funds to
NGOs. The Advisory Committee Report indicates that the TNDT had disbursed no
more than RI7 million by the end of 1996. This is insignificant, particularly when one
considers the total volume of funds that TNDT received. The government allocated
about R50 million and the EU contributed R75 million to match the GNU
contribution (Advisory Committee Report: 1997: 32).
The TNDT was therefore replaced by the National Development Agency on 1 April
2000. The NDA is the statutory body responsible for allocating funds from the South
African government, foreign governments, and other national and international donor
agencies to NGOs to carry out development programmes. Similarly to those of the
TNDT, the NDA priorities reflect the development objectives set out in the
MTEF/RDP. Table 2.3 indicates the NDA disbursement by sector between 2000 and
2002.
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Table 2.4: NDA Disbursement by sector 2000-2002
Sectors Approved amount
Education & Training R59. 2 m
Economic Development RI6. 8 m
Health R26.8m
Rural Development R9.7m
Urban Renewal RI8000
http://www.nda.org.za/programmes/dlsbursement.htm (12/1 0/2003)
Lastly, the NDA attached various management requirements to the allocation of
funds. For projects to be accepted they have to meet the following management
requirements:
• Beneficiary Participation - The beneficiaries of the project should as much as
possible be involved in the planning, management and implementation of the
project. There should be a high local awareness of the initiative, and if
possible the beneficiaries should have representation in the management
structure. The level of community participation of the project should also be
considered.
• Economic viability - The project should demonstrate adequate planning In
order to ensure future sustainability.
• Skills transfer and utilisation - The activities of the project should result in the
transfer of skills and development, as means to a developmental end.
• Balanced gender involvement - Wherever possible the project should have a
balance in gender participation and decision-making roles, as well as
benefiting from the outcome of the project;
• Institutional capacity - The applicants should demonstrate that they have the
capacity and support to implement their proposed initiative;
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• Financial management - The appropriate systems should be in place to manage
and report on the project's financial resources. Where this is lacking, measures
should be taken by the NDA to build capacity in that organisation;
• Development suitability - The project should be integratable within and/or
contribute to development planning initiatives in the area;
• Environmental suitability - The project should be appropriate in terms of the
local technological, geographical and economic characteristics of the areal;
• Socio-cultural suitability - The design should be sensitive to the customary
and cultural practices of the area;
• Accountability - Applicants should be accountable to beneficiaries as well as a
governing body. Governance structures must also be representative of the
beneficiaries;
• Previous funding - All applicants must declare all previous and current
funding received both from TNDTINDA and other funding organisations.
(http://www.nda.org.za/funding/criteria.htm)
The NDA, however, experienced difficulties since its inception. In its first year of
operation of R340 million the agency had to channel to NGOs, less than one tenth
was actually disbursed. Most of the blame for this poor performance was directed at
the agency's first Chief Executive Officer, who was forced to resign in April 2001
after allegations of incompetence and mismanagement (See Smith
http://www.nu.ac.za/csdslPublications/ donor_9 .PDF).
2.6 Conclusion
From the discussion above it is clear that purpose and the intent of foreign donor
policies resemble the NPA, which embodies two basic sets of beliefs: neo-liberal
economics and liberal democracy. First, markets and private initiative are seen as the
most efficient mechanisms for achieving growth and providing social services.
Government emphasised private initiatives through its GEAR strategy to promote
small, medium and micro enterprises (SMMEs) as a strategy for employment creation
and income generation. International donor agencies endorsed this strategy through
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their private sector development programmes. There was, therefore support for
various government programmes and institutions that have been established to ensure
the development of SMMEs. This includes support for Khula Enterprise, Ntsika
Enterprise, Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) and the Department of trade
and Industry's (DTI) development programme. The government's role in this context
was to enable and facilitate private provision and to minimise its own direct role in
the economy.
NOOs playa significant role in development. To this effect, the government created
the TNDT. As indicated above, its mandate was to serve as an interim development
finance agency that works as part of the national development strategy (which is
encompassed in both RDP and METF) for the alleviation of poverty. It does this by
supporting organisations of civil society in their efforts to promote sustainable,
people-centred development.
Secondly, foreign donors contend that a sustainable market economy requires a
liberal democratic polity with a strong civil society. NOOs are supposed to act as
vehicles for democratic consolidation. They are supposed to act as a counter weight to
state power, protecting human rights, opening up channels of communication and
participation, providing grounds for activists and promoting pluralism. Prior to 1994,
in order to assist the transition from apartheid, foreign donors provided support to
NOOs that were serving the majority population in the areas of human rights,
community and leadership development, and conflict resolution. During the run-up to
the 1994 elections, they provided significant support for election administration and
for voter education.
During the post-1994 period the government lacked a framework that informed
D&OG and foreign donors accordingly developed their own programmes for
democratic assistance. Donors focused their attention to reshaping aspects of the
'limited state'. For example, institutions such as DoJ, the National Prosecuting
Agency and other specialised justice institutions linked to the ministry received major
support. Furthermore, since 1994 international donors funded a number of D&OO
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NGOs. These include IDASA; the Helen Suzman foundation; the Khulekeni Institute
for Democracy; the EISA; and the SAIRR. In this context international donor
agencies saw NGOs playing a critical role in the consolidation of South Africa's new
democracy. What characterise these NGOs are their focus on strengthening
institutional democracy rather than advocacy NGOs as defined in Chapter One.
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Chapter Three
The New Policy Agenda and NGO State relations
3.1 Introduction
The previous chapter attempted to illustrate the link between Official Donor
Assistance (ODA) and the New Policy Agenda (NPA). It is also argued that prior to
1994 large donor funding to NGOs was based primarily on solidarity with, and
support for, community struggles and the broader social movements against the
apartheid state. With the demise of the apartheid system donor priorities changed.
Funds were re-channelled towards government and priority was given to programmes
associated with the NPA.
This chapter argues that the changes in international development assistance had a
significant impact on the role ofNGOs and NGO relations with the new state. Firstly,
NGOs experienced serious financial crises, which forced some to close down,
retrench members, or to employ fund-raising strategies to sustain their operations.
The re-channelling of funds from NGOs to government also meant that government
would lead the social service delivery programme and that NGOs would be an
extension of the state in the delivery of these services. This has resulted In
government focusing on organisations with the capacity to help the government
achieve its delivery goals at the expense of those involved in advocacy activities- i.e.
organisations that play an overt political role.
Additionally, foreign donors in the post-1994 period have emphasised the need for
financial and managerial accountability. This has resulted in urban-based, formal
NGOs with financial and managerial systems receiving the bulk of donor aid.
Consequently informal, grass roots organisations located primarily in rural and peri-
urban areas were left with no source of revenue.
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3.2 Background to the growth and development of NGOs in South Africa
Like elsewhere in Africa, the history of NOOs in South Africa is a very recent one. In
the past few years NGOs have become more visible in many parts of Africa while,
other countries such as India NGOs have a much longer history. NOOs in South
Africa emerged during the second phase of the mass democratic mobilisation,
(between 1968 and 1978). The expansion of the NGO sector was accelerated in the
third phase of mass democratic mobilisation (between 1980 and 1990). Walters
(1993: 2) observed that "The acceleration of the growth of these organisations
reached an all time high during the latter part of the 1980s, despite severe repressive
actions by the state".
Part of the reason for this growth was the formation of the United Democratic front
(UDF). According to Shubane and Madiba (1994: 243), " The formation of the United
Democratic Front. .. provided impetus for the creation of civic bodies in virtually
every township in the country. Many of those that were formed in the time were
initiated by enthusiastic local activists. Others were however formed as a result of a
UDF campaign to form civic bodies were they did not exist." For example, prior to
1983 there were few civic associations that existed in urban townships such as
Soweto, New Brighton-Kwazakhele-Zwide and those around Cape Town. After the
formation of the UDF there was an unprecedented growth of NOOs in these areas.
The NGO sector emerged during this period as a powerful force of mass mobilisation
against the government. According to Jaggernath (1995: 102), " At the local
government level, civic organisations have been the major forms of NOOs that have
been involved in community development issues [and also] emerged most strongly as
mechanisms for organising and directing activism and resistance."
Despite their advocacy role NGOs in South Africa were also involved in welfare
service activities. Walters (1993: 2) states that the function of welfare service
organisation was to provide welfare-oriented social services; to "empower" the
popular sectors through helping to educate, organise, and mobilise; to provide support
services to other organisations in order to improve their effectiveness; and to network.
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In line with the above discussion NOOs in South Africa during the apartheid period
can be categorised in terms of their diverse purpose and functions; however, their one
common and fundamental denominator was that they were committed to the agenda
of transferring political power from the minority to a popular democratically elected
government.
The nature of NOO state relations during this era was thus characterised by political
confrontation and mistrust. This resulted in debilitating mutual suspicion and lack of
co-operation. Emphasis was placed on the distance between the NOOs on the one
hand and the state on the other. Kihato and Rapoo (1994: 13) posit that this tradition
continued to grow during the political transition of the early 1990s and NOOs
envisaged that this tradition would still prevail after 1994. Kihato and Rapoo
(1994: 13) state that "The political and constitutional transformation ...triggered a
broad consensus among CSOs [civil society organisations] on a number of principles
considered vital for entrenching their existence viz: free from political interference
and manipulation; an absence of government controls and patronage; self-governed
and regulated; autonomous; not linked to the state or any of its agencies; and
accountable to members, communities, beneficiaries or stakeholders. " Yet, to a large
extend the funding environment during this period paralysed the autonomy that these
organisations envisaged.
3.3 Effects of foreign aid on NGO-State relations since 1994
The relationship between the government and the NOOs is a political one that
impinges on the roles of NOOs within society. This relationship is mediated most
directly through the enactment of a wide range of legislation. Over the years several
legal instruments have been created in terms of which NOOs can be established in
South Africa. Most notable is the Non-Profit Organisations Act (No 71 of 1997).
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According to this Act non profit organisations are Section 21 companies, trusts and
voluntary associations. Section 21 companies are the most formal legal entity in their
registration and reporting requirements (see section 21 of the Companies Act of 1973).
The second formal legal category is a trust, which can be established on a basis of a
contract (trust deed) between organisations or groups. Trusts must register with the
Public Office (Master of the Supreme Court). The least formal and most common
legal entity is the voluntary association. Voluntary associations can be formed by way
of a written or verbal agreement. There is no government registration requirement, but
they can register under the Nonprofit Organisation Act
(http://www.paralegaladvice.org.za/docs/chap15/16.html). Besides the Non-Profit
Organisation Act (No. 71 of 1997) NOOs can be legally recognised under other
legislation such as the Labour Relations Act (66 of 1995), Friendly Societies Act (25
of 1956) and National Welfare Act (100 of 1978).
However, NOO-state relationships in South Africa cannot be understood simply in
terms of the legal instruments affecting NOOs. Foreign aid has played a critical role
in shaping the nature of the relationship between the state and NOOs. The discussion
in the previous chapter, showed that since 1994 the nature of donor funding in South
Africa has changed dramatically. Firstly, much of the funding that was previously
directed to NOOs now goes to the government. This does not mean that NOOs are
excluded, but they are expected to work as junior partners to the government.
Secondly, donors tend to apportion more of their foreign aid on social delivery
programmes, intitutional democracy programmes and less on advocacy programmes.
Lastly, donors (both government donor institutions and foreign donors) are more
concerned about how money is being used and thus they demand greater financial and
managerial accountability.
Prior to 2002 there was no accurate empirical data on the size of civil society
organisations between 1994 and 1999. According to Kihoto and Rapoo (1999)
between 1995 and 1999 estimates of the number of organisations in this sector ranged
between 30 000 and 80 000. They argue that conceptual questions distorted the
assessment of these organisations.
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The recent study conducted by Swilling and Russell (2002) filled this gap. The South
African Non-Profit Sector Study adopted a unique methodology to capture the
diversity and breadth of the sector. First, they used the Johns Hopkins Comparative
Non-profit Sector Study methodology, which relied on government accounts,
supplemented by existing lists and opinions of experts on the size and scope of NOOs.
However, they found that this was inappropriate for South Africa. An alternative
approach whereby the community was used as the basis of the sampling frame rather
than NOOs. A geo-demographic model was used to select a random sample of 40
communities nationally. Within each community a snowballing technique was then
used to obtain a comprehensive list of all the NOOs. The results were weighted back
to the total number of communities within each community type in the country
(Swilling and Russell: 2002: 13).
They later found that this sampling method excluded larger and more formal NOOs. It
was therefore decided that the findings of the earlier survey should be supplemented
with PRODDER's database. The PRODDER data is a voluntary register of NOOs.
The data covers "more than 2 550 development organisations active throughout
[South Africa] ... It is divided into nine provincial sections with each organisation
classified according to 68 keywords, e.g. adult basic education, early childhood
development, poverty relief, and voter education. The publication is enhanced by the
inclusion of OIS maps indicating the spatial distribution of organisations working on
inter alia HIV/AIDS, gender and rural issues."
(http://www.hsrc.ac.zalabout/annuaIReport/2001/hsrc_fs.html?prodder.html~main )
Swilling and Russell (2002:52) argue that, although the PRODDER database is the
most comprehensive and most up to date, it is far from complete as it tends to
concentrate on more formal NOOs.
They further found that trade unions were under-represented in the mam survey.
These results were supplemented with data provided by the Department of Labour.
This ensured a more accurate representation of NOOs. There were about 98 920
NOOs in 1999. It is, however, difficult to assess whether there has been a decrease in
the number on NOOs during the post-1994, period given the lack of accurate
empirical evidence in the pre-1994 period and up until 1999.
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However, there is evidence that shows that after 1994 a numbers of NGOs collapsed
as a result of the funding crises caused by international donors channelling funding
through the government. Organisations previously referred to as development partners
were dumped by their foreign partners. Consequently many organisations, having no
other alternative sources of revenue, had to close down. According to Kihato and
Rapoo (1999: 40), the Independent Development Trust (lDT) 1995 survey results
indicated that NGOs were in serious financial difficulty. It was estimated that about
1000 NGOs, mainly engaged in welfare activities, collapsed as the result of funding
cutbacks.
Smith (1995: 35) identified some of the NGOs, which had to close their projects and
retrenched their staff members. These NGOs included:
• Teacher upgrading programme, the Molteno project, which had in-service
courses for 1500 teachers, closed down. It closed an adult literacy project and
retrenched some staff members;
• the Planned Parenthood Association had a shortfall of R3.1 m and had to
retrench some staff members as well as closing four projects.
• the Goldfields Science and Mathematics Resource Centre, a science and math
upgrading programme for pupils in the Western Cape, which also trained them
on computers, received no funding in 1995 and thus retrenched 14 staff
members;
• the African Cooperative Action Trust, which established and serviced 759
saving clubs and more than 6 300 micro-projects in KwaZulu Natal had a
shortfall ofR3m; and
• the Disabled People of SA intended to close four of their seven regional
programmes in 1995 and later three of the remaining programmes. It was
estimated that this would affect 140 self-help groups and 25 000 disabled
people.
Some argue that NGOs collapsed as a result of administrative inadequacy and
corruption following high-profile cases. Because of the apartheid funding
environment characterised by lack of stringent control measures, many organisations
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did not develop the basic skills required for running an organisation. As a result many
organisations were unable to perform basic internal tasks, such as drafting project
proposals, budgets and strategic plans.
There is also evidence that some NGOs collapsed as a result of corruption for
example, the Foundation for Peace and Justice set up by Allen Boesak's congregation,
of which he was director and trustee. Boesak was found guilty and convicted on four
counts of fraud and theft, and sentenced to six years for defrauding and stealing from
overseas donors.
However, Kotzé (1999: 178) warns that "contrary to the often simplistic and negative
portrayal of NGOs as incompetent and corrupt... thousands of good development
organisations served hundreds of thousands of people over many dark decades of
apartheid." Therefore, it is crucial to develop a balanced perspective about the past
(and future) roles of NGOs. While some organisations have collapsed as a result of
their administrative inadequacy and corruption, there are many organisations that
benefited poor communities, which were closed as a result of financial crisis.
Kotzé (1999) points to the case of Valley Trust, an NGO based in the Valley of a
Thousand Hills outside Durban in KwazululNatal as an example. This NGO had been
involved with the provision of health and nutrition services. Its officials initiated
discussion and co-operation with the provincial Health department, but government
officials did not support their efforts. Keith Wimbie director of Valley Trust (as
quoted in Kotzé 1999: 179), states that "We were told that we must slow down
because we are going too fast, we are ahead of the game. In fact, what he [Deputy
Minister of Health] is not taking cognisance of is the fact that we have been doing it
for so long, it is not a case that we going too fast; we are providing services where
government previously never did." As a result they had to retrench some of their staff
and go through the process of transforming the organisation into a training center.
This case represents the expenence of many NGOs, which were involved in
communities and the broader process of reconstruction and development, which had
either to close down or to transform themselves into income-generating organisations
due to the rechannelling of funds from NGOs to the government. This has led to a
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permanent loss of capacity in the crucial civil society sector. Kotzé (1999: 180) argues
that this loss of capacity was most felt in rural areas, "where the demise of the local
NGOs or CBOs simply took away the only recourse poor people had to some sort of
legal advice, literacy and training programmes, small income-generating projects and
a conduit to social welfare grants." Those that survived were forced to charge poor
communities for their services, a situation that caused tension between NGOs and
these communities. By late 1996 there were flyers in rural areas accusing NGOs of
setting themselves up as consultancies (Kotzé: 1999: 180).
The rechannelling of funds from NGOs to the government also meant that
government would lead programmes for social services. The fact that major donors
such as the EU decided to channel their funding through the RDP office meant that
government would control the NGO sector's activities and funding. Thus, since 1994
development has increasingly became a top-down process rather than a process
driven by small-scale community led projects. Seeking states that:
The elections of 1994 (at national and provincial level) and 1995 (at the local
level) changed the political and institutional environment in which capacity
building has taken place. Development-which had served as the focus of much
CBO activity in the early 1990's was now the responsibility of the state, at least
primarily. Civil society was now regarded as a complement to, rather than as
substitute for the state and representative institutions of government that
supposedly control state. (http://www.nu.ac.za/csds/Publications/donor _19.PDF).
Government sought to place the responsibility for social delivery on government
departments. Statements made by government officials also revealed an underlying
perception that civil society should only serve as a delivery partner of the
government. According to Kihato (2001: 18):
Kader Asmal, then minister of water affairs and forestry, said a funding crisis
could threaten the 'valuable development work' ofNGOs, and urged international
development funders to support them. But he added that it was imperative for
NGOs to work with the government, and indicated that they would be funded
through the RDP office. The then minister without portfolio responsible for the
RDP, Jay Naidoo, is said to have urged NGOs to establish a body that would co-
ordinate the sector's relationship and development activities with those of the
government. Gauteng's MEC for finance and then secretary of the South African
Communist Party (SACP), Jabu Moleketi, argued that the survival of the sector
was essential because NGOs could bolster the government's capacity to deliver.
He reportedly stated that NGOs should become 'part and parcel' of the RDP, and
[to integrate] their programmes with the latter.
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There is also practical evidence that corroborates the assertion that NGOs were only
viewed as junior partners responsible for implementing projects. In the period
immediately after 1994, government developed programmes with less NGO
participation and input. For example these, programmes include:
• The Community Based Public Works Programme (CBPWP) managed by the
Department of Public Works (DPW);
• the Consolidated Municipal Infrastructure Programme (CMlP) of the
Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG); and
• the Poverty Relief and Infrastructure Investment Fund (PRlIF) of the (then)
Department of Welfare and Population Development.
To implement the CBPWP the DPW instituted the Pre-Implementation Task Team
(PITT), which "was to ensure that NGOs were brought into the programme to assist
in project management... [at the beginning] of the programme NGO participation had
mainly been through the NGOs who acted as project implementing agents" (Ntsime:
2000: 113). Ntsime further notes that some were appointed as [Project Implementing
Agents] PIAs and continued to play a critical role in the subsequent CBPWP
implementation.
Government prioritisation of development programmes has had a fundamental impact
on the distribution of funds. The type of funding that is available is project and
programme specific. Thus as, Conradie (1999: 294-295) puts it, "Chances of
obtaining funding for a South African NGO development project are certainly better
ifit can be shown how RDP objectives will be promoted." As shown in Chapter Two,
for TNDT's and NDA's (statutory bodies responsible for disbursal of funds to CSOs
to carry out development programmes) criteria for funding was that the project must
reflect the objectives ofRDP (See Tables 2.3 & 2.4).
In an interview conducted by Reitzes and Friedman (200 1: 26) the NDA official
contented that advocacy "falls strictly outside [NDA] ambit: its central mission is not
to transform government or realign its programme but to act in support of it." In view
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of this, which organisations are more likely to be funded by the state? The
government has focused on organisations with the capacity to help achieve its
delivery goals at the expense of organisations that play an overt political role. Rapoo
and Kihato (1999: 33) looked at four broad sectors: political and democratic;
economic and social welfare; and education and training. They found that an
overwhelming 78.8% of respondents funded by government are involved in health
and social welfare activities. This was followed by 58.9% in the education and
training sector; and 28.4% in economic development. Only 11.6% have political and
democratic objectives. This objectives reflected a bias towards institutional
democracy, i.e. capacity building, democratic practices such as voter education,
policy making and implementation, strengthening the justice system, and human
rights education and public awareness. This figures compares favourably with
Swilling and Russell's estimations. They state, " Not surprisingly, the bulk of
government funds (4.9 billion out of the total 5.8 billion) went to the social service
(R2.1 billion), health (Rl.7 billion), and development and housing (R1.1 billion)
sectors" (Swilling and Russell: 2001: 35).
This funding approach has resulted in a shift in support for NGOs involved with
advocacy activities to welfarist NGOs or PSCs. According to the Cawthra et al (2001:
137), the government chooses to support larger, well-organised, delivery-oriented
NGOs rather than smaller NGOs with a more political agenda (pursuing social justice
through advocacy and lobbying).
This has served to erode the role of NGOs in policy decision-making processes or
democratic consolidation. In the immediate post-apartheid period a struggle broke out
over how the roles of NGOs should be defined. The new government sought to
reconstitute a relationship that has been largely adversarial through the establishment
of the RDP. The role of the NGOs in decision making was clearly defined within the
RDP. It defined the role of civil society as one in which civil society will playa
critical role in policy formulation and implementation and eradicating poverty
through delivery of basic services.
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In summary the RDP focused on the following:
• Participation of civil society organisations in the policy-making process: the
RDP document demanded that consultative policy forums be continued after
the elections to ensure participation of all the important stakeholders in the
policy process; and
• an active civil society sector in the implementation of the RDP: foreseeing that
the new government would have limited capacity to deliver services to the
poor, the RDP urged civil society organisations "to develop RDP programmes
of action and campaigns within their own sectors and communities."
(http://www.case.org.za/htm/civilsaf.htm)
Despite NGOs being acknowledged in official rhetoric such as the RDP, the lack of
financial resources undermined the role of NGOs in deepening democracy. Before
proceeding to discuss the impact of aid on the role of NGOs in democratic
consolidation, it is important that we look at the South African policy-making
process. It is not easy to discern a specific South African policy-making process.
According to Kihato and Rapoo (1999: 31):
These processes are extremely fluid, occurring over a long period and involving
a host of actors. The complex nature of policy-making, involving informal and
obscure processes as well as formal and distinct ones, makes it difficult to
define the stages involved in policy-making and their sequence. Policy-making
is a continuous, cyclical, process in which decisions are constantly shifting and
problems consistently redefined.
However, the process of developing and passing laws consists of three stages. First,
the relevant ministry produces the discussion document. This is followed by research
and the publication of a Green Paper. At this stage the public or interested
stakeholders are allowed to participate through public forums such as meetings,
workshops and seminars. This process culminates with the production of the White
Paper, which, after further public comment, is tabled in the cabinet and, if approved,
is gazetted. The White Paper becomes Bill if it goes through a first reading in
Parliament. It is then referred to portfolio committees, which can hold public hearings
at which stakeholders make submissions about aspects they feel need to be addressed.
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With the necessary amendments made, the Bill returns to Parliament for a second
reading. If it is approved, it becomes law once the president assents to it. On the other
hand there, are also other informal mechanisms to influence policy. These included
methods such as demonstrations, strikes, stay-aways and lobbying.
In their study Kihato and Rapoo (1999: 32) found that more than two thirds (65.5%)
of NGOs who participated in their study were involved in the formulation of
government Green and White papers. NGOs contributed through making written
submissions and comments to the relevant ministry. They also participated in
government departments' summits and workshops to make their verbal submissions
or express their opinions on the Green or White Paper.
However, the study revealed a significant link between financial problems and impact
on the policy-making process. Kihato and Rapoo (1999: 42) argued that
"organisations that experienced serious financial problems have low perceived impact
[on policy]. This finding is verified by responses [that organisations made, claiming]
that their poor financial status affected their ability to make meaningful contributions
to the democratic process. Since they struggle to survive financially, their ability to
participate in policy-making becomes severely undermined."
Lack of NGO participation in policy making is not entirely the result of a lack of
financial resources. The way in which avenues for participatory democracy have
operated in South Africa since 1994 has also served to marginalise NGOs. The most
notable case in this regard is the way the National Economic, Development and
Labour Council (NEDLAC) functioned. The government established NEDLAC with
a view to fostering active participation in decision making. According to Bendix
(1996: 102), NEDLAC was "intended to represent all major stakeholders and to
consult on economic, industrial relations and labour market policy." It is thus
composed of four chambers dealing with monetary and fiscal policy, trade and
industry, labour, and development. The first three are made up of government
representatives, business and labour and the forth includes community leaders
representing. for example, women, civic organisations, rural bodies and disabled
persons.
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It is widely perceived that forums are necessary to ensure effective interaction
between government and those with an interest in development outcomes. The
creation of forums does not necessarily mean that there will be effective interaction
between the state and those who have an interest in development outcomes. They
conversely serve to exclude NGOs from participation. Formal structures such as
NEDLAC, which allow strong organised, private interest does not guarantee access to
the state. Friedman and Reitzes (1995: 10) termed this arrangement "democratic
corporatism". They argue that the purpose of this arrangement "is not to empower
civil society, but to formalise the participation of interests who already have power
and whose demands the state needs to incorporate if it is to govern effectively." For
stakeholders to participate in this corporatist arrangement, it is essential that the
stakeholders are able to bind their constituencies to negotiated agreements. They
argue that international experience has shown that producer groups- i.e. business
organisations, trade unions and professional associations- have the capacity to do this.
According to Friedman and Reitzes (1995: 11), business and labour interests are
strong producer interests, with definable constituencies who pay dues to their
employer associations or trade unions, that both are organised, and that they
have at least the potential to bind crucial constituencies to negotiated
agreements. NEDLAC also formalises an existing bargaining relationship,
which produced an agreement on new labour legislation during the 1980s.
Whatever its fate, three of its chambers represent an attempt to introduce a
mode of interaction between the state and strong private interest with a proven
ability to coexist with democratic institutions and to enhance industrial
efficiency and equity.
Conversely, consumer groups such as the unemployed, rural dwellers and other
marginalised groups are incapable of this. These organisations are weak consumer
associations with no definable constituencies and less organised. To argue that the
fourth chamber of NEDLAC was created to include these organisations in a
corporatist arrangement is misleading. This is mainly because the representation of
organisations within NEDLAC is based on the ability of organisations to organise,
therefore if groups are unable to organise, then their opportunity to participate IS
constrained. This means that NEDLAC is not a fully representative institution.
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This reasoning is also based on the fallacy that those who are not included in the
state-initiated institution are denied access to the government. The nature of civil
society is that it serves to represents the interest of a plural society to afford those
without voice a platform to express their concerns. Effective democracies should not
subject organisations to 'gate keeping'. Cohen and Arato state that "an antagonistic
relationship of civil society, or its actors, to the economy or the state arises only
when ... institutions of economic and political society serve to insulate decision
making ... from the influence of social organisations, initiatives, and forms of public
discussions" (Cohen and Arato: 1992: x-xi).
Furthermore, NGOs wishing to be incorporated into NEDLAC will have to apply and
a committee chaired by a representative of the RDP office approves their
applications. This means that a government official will choose representatives of
civil society. It is therefore likely that government will identify organisations that suit
the government ideal typology (i.e. a delivery and apolitical partner) rather than those
that play an overt political role.
There is general consensus among NGOs that government has been uncomfortable
with the idea of an independent civil society playing an overt political role. Indeed the
sector has come under fire on vanous occasions for being too critical of the
government. Nelson Mandela's speech at the ANC conference in Mafikeng
(December 1997) is most often cited as evidence indicating the government's
dissatisfaction with NGOs playing an overt political role. President Mandela stated
that:
Pretending to represent an independent and popular view, supposedly obviously
legitimized by the fact that they are described as non-governmental organisations,
these NGOs also work to corrode the influence of the movement. .. they lack an
issue based driven mass base that is the defining feature of any NGO and
therefore are unable to raise funds from people themselves. This has also created
the possibility for some of these NGOs to act as instruments of foreign
governments and institutions that fund them to promote the interest of these
external forces (Mandela: 1997).
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Seekings argued that this attack was directed at IDASA which had recently criticised
the government's approach to corruption and aggrandisement
(http://www.nu.ac.za/csds/Publications/donor _19.PDF). As NGOs are increasingly
expected to work in partnership with government, this raises questions regarding
some of the most defining characteristics of civil society, viz: freedom and autonomy
vis-a-vis the state. How can organisations funded by and with government contracts,
for example, go about lobbying for fundamental changes and reforms in society? How
can they mobilise social movements that express the needs and demands of millions
of people on the margins of the society?
As argued above, some NGOs became implementers of government projects,
including the CBPWP, the CMIP and the PRIIF. Others have shown their discontent
with the way funding has been disbursed. According to Kihato (2001: 22) "One
respondent [in a survey on NGOs] claimed that funders have their own interest and
political agendas, and do not care about the powerless communities." These
organisations became reformist remaining committed to ensuring participatory
governance through working with marginalised people, helping them to raise
concerns at state level and at the same time working with government to improve
delivery and policies. According to Kumi Naidoo, the director of South African Non-
Governmental Organisation Coalition (SANGOCO), in the first few years after the
first national democratic elections:
NGOs were consumed with helping government to be a good government by
doing much of its work. This often made it difficult for NGOs to critisise
government where this has been necessary. There was an almost unspoken
reluctance to be too hard on government. NGOs felt a need to stand back and
give them a chance (Marks: 1999: 10).
Marks (1999: 10-11) adds that:
However, according to Naidoo, NGOs no longer accept their role as simply
assisting government. While they remain committed to ensuring a successful
and good government, they recognise the importance of defining their role
also as lobbying government to ensure the best possible service delivery is
available to the poor, and to society as a whole
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This involved a delicate and difficult balancing act. According to Marks (1999: Il):
It involves working with the government where there is a common ground, but
also maintaining a distinct independence to ensure a lobbying capacity. In order
to do this, the NGO coalition now makes use of new public fora, which include
parliament standing committees, public hearings, and petitions. Participation in
these fora, would allow for a linking with other civil society forces, and would
serve to keep government on its toes. Throughout these efforts, the NGO
network has asserted the importance of independent thought. ..
The creation of SANGOCO should also be viewed as an attempt to unify and
strengthen the NGOs (particularly NGOs that used to be committed almost
exclusively to the anti-apartheid movement, and thus have had to struggle in the post-
apartheid period to develop a new positive role). Thus when it was formed in August
1995 its mission statement was "to promote civil society by uniting and strengthening
the NGO sector to enable it to influence development policy and advocate
programmes that meet the needs of the poor in the best possible way, at the least
cost." It should be noted that SANGOCO is not, nor does it claim to be, the sole
legitimate representative of the entire NGO community. It does, however, adhere to a
view of civil society as a place where different interests compete in a pluralist
framework (http://www.case.org.zalhtm/civilsaf.htm#9094). The extent to which
NGOs managed to maintain their autonomy against the government requires further
research.
The post-1994 funding period was also marked by an emphasis on financial and
managerial accountability. Although social concerns remain central to donor agencies
they have imposed onerous financial and managerial conditionalities. Thus NGOs are
required to provide business plans as part of a project proposal. These will indicate
time scales, consultation information, expected outputs, performance indicators,
information management indicators and communication strategies. Secondly, they
have to provide financial statements (preferably audited), income and expenditure, a
constitution, letters of support and authentication from formal organisations, names of
donor agencies approached, information on the organisation's track record, and the
fund-raising strategy and sustainability plan. Finally, five-year planning and multi-
year budgeting are important exercises, which include projections, careful budgeting
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and a degree of financial discipline (Conradie 1999: 294). For example, when PITT
was given the responsibility to ensuring that NGOs were brought into the CBPWP to
assist in project management, adverts were placed in newspapers inviting submission
only from NGOs. The basic requirement was to show that the organisation has
managed R5 m over the past few years, a condition which many small NGOs were
unable to meet (Ntsime: 2001: 120).
It is therefore not surprising that donors and government preferred NGOs that are
registered as section 21 companies or trusts. Kihato and Rapoo (1999: 9) state that:
Commentators argue that donors and other stake holders who are concerned about
the security of their interest, financial accountability and legal certainty prefer the
relatively high degree of formality and security offered by trusts or section 21
companies. But the financial costs of the procedures necessary for establishing,
registering and administering trusts and 'section 21s' often deter some groups
intending to take this route.
Very few locally based NGOs in South Africa are registered as section 21 companies
or trusts. Many local and informal associations employ the least formal and stringent
route (i.e. voluntary associations) to establish organisations. Swilling and Russell
(2002: 20) state that "No less than 53 per cent of the NPOs in [their] study can be
classified as less formalised, community-based NPOs, that is they are not formally
structured as section 21 non-profit companies, trusts, religious institutions, trade
unions, or co-operatives." Table 3.2 shows the number ofNGOs by legal status.
Table 3.2: Number ofNGOs by legal status
Legal status Number ofNGOs
InformalNoluntary 53929
Section 21 company 11 459
Religious Organisation 16 105
Union 4569
stokvellBurial society 2472
Trust/foundation 3891
59
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Political Party 2448
Co-operatives 644
Other 5772
Total 101 289
Source: Swilling & Russell: 2002: 21
This has had a fundamental impact on the distribution of funds. Whereas prior to
1994 a greater variety of organisations received donor funding, ranging from formal
urban-based NGOs to small, informal and rural community-based organisations, the
spectrum of recipients has been narrowed down. The new funding mechanism means
that informal, less visible, grassroots organisations located in rural and peri urban
areas are less likely to receive donor funding. As noted in Chapter One, these
organisations play an important role, because they have the capacity to reach the
poorest, and outreach to remote areas, to promote local participation and to
implement projects in direct collaboration with target beneficiary groups, to operate
on low costs, to be innovative, experimental, adaptive and flexible, to strengthen local
institutions/organisations; and to empower marginal groups. Swilling and Russell
(2002: 20) further note that they play an important role with regard to poverty
alleviation, responding to immediate problems at a community level far quickly than
more formal structures, particularly the government. Thus they are well positioned to
deal with the HIV/AIDS crisis effectively, as they would be providing support and
care to the poorest of the poor, who have few other channels of assistance.
The reason why international donors preferred highly, formal and well-resourced
orgnisations such as section 21 companies and trusts can be attributed to the fact that
most of them have the administrative capacity required by international donors.
Voluntary associations lack the administrative skills to be able handle donor
requirements. They are less visible and also are without structured administrations or
membership. Thus their capacity to engage with donors is low.
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On the other hand, the voluntary organisations' mode of operation to strengthen
democracy is largely confrontational which is "far removed from the non-
confrontational framework donors prefer"(Kihato: 2001: 21). As shown in Chapter
Two, political funding by USAID focused on NGOs that were serving the majority
population in the areas of human rights, community and leadership development, and
conflict resolution. During the run up to the 1994 elections, USAID provided
significant support for election administration and for voter education, government
capacity building, and strengthening policy making and implementation. This reflects
biasness towards strengthening institutional democracy rather that participatory
democracy.
Similarly to USAID, EU has also focused on areas such as, supporting the transition
to democracy, human rights education and public awareness (development of
teaching, research and education); initiatives for target groups needing specific
protection or attention such as children, indigenous people, migrants, refugees and
displaced people, victims of torture, women and some professions such as journalists
and security sector and legal personnel. These donor approaches predetermine which
NGOs they are likely to work with directly. Most often, these are formal, high profile,
urban based and skilled NGOs. This severely hampers the role of NGOs because
'elitist' or professional NGOs that donors favour are not located at grassroots level
and are also not representative of the masses.
3.4 Conclusion
This chapter investigated the dynamics between the state and NGOs in the post-
apartheid era. In recent years international donor agencies have shifted their focus
from NGOs to the government. Since 1994 foreign donors mainly worked with the
government. This is in contrast to NGO-donor relations during the apartheid era.
Funding was largely channelled through NGOs such as Kagiso Trust and the South
African Bishops Conference. Recent developments have had implications for the role
of NGOs. The funding crisis which these organisations experienced, as a result of
international donor agencies focusing on government forced many of them to close
down, or retrench some of their staff members or employ fundraising strategies to
sustain their operations.
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The shift of focus among international donor agencies from NGOs to the government
also meant that government would take the lead in service delivery. NGOs are
expected to work in partnership (certainly as junior partners) with the South African
government. With regard to some international donor agencies such as the EU, this
expectation is implicit in the choice of projects and the funding allocated to
government. Among other international donor agencies, such as USAID, it is explicit.
The government has also shown dissatisfaction with the idea of an independent civil
society playing an overtly political role. Thus on several occasions NGOs have come
under fire from government for being too critical. Nelson Mandela's speech at the
ANC conference in Mafikeng (December 1997) is a case in point.
Cumulatively, this has served to undermine the capacity of NGOs to engage in
vigorous advocacy and policy making. Although some NGOs continue to work within
the ambit of government, some have shown dissatisfaction with the way funding has
been disbursed. They argue that foreign donors have their own agendas, which are not
benefiting the majority who are poor. Consequently these organisations formed
themselves into a consortium SANGOCO, which attempts to unify and strengthen
NGOs' hand against government.
Furthermore, some foreign aid is now being channelled through elitist organisations,
which, lack legitimacy among the grassroots constituency. Methods used by these
NGOs to strengthen democracy fit the donors operating framework. Their method of
engagement with the state is formal and less confrontational. Support for these
organisations is also influenced by their administrative capacity. Many of the NGOs
do not fit this 'ideal' donor typology sufficiently to be recipients of political aid. They
rely on confrontational methods of engagement with the state and lack the
administrative capacity to deal with donor processes.
This takes place in an environment where powerful and well organised groups such as
business and labour have become dominant and where the voices of marginalised
people, mainly the rural poor, are in danger of being neglected. The role ofNGOs and
CBOs has become crucially important, as they seek to provide a vehicle for the
demands of the most marginalised sectors in society.
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Although a corporatist arrangement such as NEDLAC is important in shaping policy
among the major players (government, business and organised labour) in the
economic arena, it is also problematic in a country with a high unemployment rate
and a large informal sector. The majority of people who are not employed or are
employed in the informal sector are left out of major decision-making process with
regard to socio-economic policies, and their voices are not heard, except when they
employ mass action strategies, destroy property, or engage in other disruptive
activities. In the absence of institutional channels for the expression of grievances,
this kind of action can destabilise government. Making the country ungovernable was
a strategy that was used in the 1980s and it helped in bringing down the apartheid
regime. To attempt to use this strategy, without clear political goals and with no
alternative leadership, would be disastrous.
Changes in the foreign aid funding process also raises the broader question with
regard to the effectiveness of foreign aid. Clearly, foreign funding in South Africa has
taken a top-down approach rather than bottom-up approach. This has undermined the
effective role that NGOs play in addressing poverty and consolidating democracy.
Since 1994 the ruling party has consolidated its power, thus it is necessary to
strengthen mass movements.
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Chapter Four
Conclusion and Recommendations
4.1 Summation of findings
The aim of this study was to explore the influence of the post-1994 funding regime on
NGO-state relations in South Africa. The nature of NGO-state relations pre-1994
period was largely confrontational because of the state's exclusionary politics. NGO
movements during this period emerged as a powerful force of mass mobilisation
against the apartheid state. Despite their advocacy role, NGOs in South Africa were
also involved in welfare service activities.
International donor agencies were sympathetic to the fight against the apartheid
regime. Donors were lax about monitoring recipient organisations and the
expenditure of their funds. They employed a bottom-up approach (i.e. local actors had
a lot of say in determining who received aid) in providing funding. However, since
1994 there were dramatic changes in foreign aid policies.
Since 1994 the purpose and intent of ODA policies are to advance the NPA. In this
context markets and private initiative are seen as the most efficient mechanisms for
achieving economic growth and meeting the developmental challenges of South
Africa. Governments enable and facilitate private provision, but should minimize
their direct role in the economy. NGOs should playa significant role in providing
services. This is because of their cost effectiveness in reaching the poorest members
of the population. Thus the functional purpose of NGOs is to humanise the adverse
effects of the market economy.
Although markets and private initiative are seen as the efficient mechanisms for
meeting the developmental challenges of South Africa the evidence presented in
suggests that significant foreign aid resources were allocated to social delivery
programmes with a focus on water and sanitation, health, housing, education and
training. For example, about 60% oftotal EU funding was allocated to the delivery of
social services between 1997 and 1999.
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The development of the private sector with the aim to improve internal and external
competitiveness of South Africa only amounted to 20% of EU total foreign aid.
USAID allocated only US$163 million to private sector development programmes,
which included private sector development and economic capacity programme
compared to US$724.4 million to social delivery programs, which include education,
health, and housing. This means that although markets and private initiative are seen
as critical to meeting the developmental challenges of South Africa, social service
delivery was the major recipient of aid in the post 1994 period. The international
donor community considered both the developmental requirements of the country as
well as its social needs in a critical period of transition.
Secondly, since 1994 donors have been preoccupied with democratic consolidation.
Donors contend that a sustainable market economy requires a liberal democratic
polity with a strong civil society. Political aid in this regard was biased towards
strengthening institutional democracy. Thus, political aid was targetted at NGOs that
were concerned with the strengthening of norms and practices of procedural
democracy. Hearn (2000: 828) concludes that:
"political aid to civil society has had two major consequences. First it has
changed the debate on democracy. During the past five years, it is possible to
see a process in which democracy has been redefined. Although half of South
Africans still believe that access to housing, jobs and a decent income are
essential components of a democratic society, this residual belief in social
democracy is being eroded and replaced by the norms and practice of
procedural democracy. It is our argument that the north has played its role in
this process by funding the liberal proponents of procedural democracy in
civil society ... The second consequence is that this has facilitated a newly
legitimised South African state that presides over the same intensely
exploitative economic system, but this time unchallenged. External and
domestic support for procedural democracy has successfully removed all
challenges to the system. It has ensured that democracy in the new south is not
about reconstructing the social order but about effective maintenance."
Thirdly, foreign aid agencies have regarded government as the conduit for the
disbursing of funds. Government departments were allocated funds to implement
development programmes and to provide funding to NGOs, which would assist them
in implementing these programmes. Furthermore, institutions such as the TNDT -
later replaced by the NDA- were established to allocate funding to NGOs.
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International donor agencies' shift of focus from NGOs to the government meant that
government would take the lead in service delivery. NGOs are expected to work in
partnership (certainly as junior partners) with the South African government. This
top-down funding approach has resulted in the prioritisation of NGOs with the
capacity to support government to achieve its delivery goals at the expense of
advocacy NGOs who are critical of government policy to influence and advocate
alternatives. This has served to undermine the capacity of many NGOs to engage in
vigorous advocacy and influencing policy making.
The rechannelling of aid funds to government has also had a significant impact on the
distribution of funds. NGOs have been facing serious finacial crises. Government
funding institutions, such as the NDA, further exacerbated these crises because they
lacked the organisational capacity to disburse their funds efficiently. For example, it is
claimed that the NDA lacks efficient systems and procedures for processing funding
applications. According to the Mail & Guardian (2002):
"large numbers of cash-strapped NGOs were waiting for the NDA to assess their
funding applications, and in some cases even to return phone calls. One of the
NGOs had submitted its application three times. The first and the second
applications were lost and the NGO only received a reference number when a
third application was hand-delivered. It took nine months for the reference
number to be issued by the NDA."
Furthermore, according to a report complied by the Non-Profit Partnership (NNP):
"A more general concern expressed by grant-makers and in the information
Frank Meintjies received from 'organisations on the ground' was that the NDA
is 'stuck' and is not able to process the approximately 6 000 applications for
funding that it received in response to its most recent call for new funding
applications between 2 January and 28 February 2002. The perception is that
the money is not flowing and a sharp distinction is drawn here between money
that is allocated and money that is actually disbursed"
(http://www.npp.org.zalresources/reports/nda/NDA _research.doc).
Fourthly, since 1994 donors became concerned about how their money was being
spent and they demanded greater financial accountability. As Kihato puts it " ... more
stringent grant practices have resulted from a global move towards ensuring that aid
to developing countries is utilised for the purpose intended, and the need for donor
countries to account more rigorously to their taxpayers"
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(http://www.cps.org.zalexecsummJrr86). Thus the question of who receives aid and
how they use it is determined by donor agencies and the government rather than the
beneficiaries of aid, as was the case during apartheid. Consequently the spectrum of
NGOs that received funding narrowed, because small, informal, and rural community
based organisations lacked the reasonable administrative, research and delivery
capacity, required by international donor agencies. Many of these NGOs experienced
serious financial crises, which at times forced them to close down.
4.2 Recommendations
To resuscitate the role and to ensure continued survival of the advocacy NGOs and
participatory democracy, it will be essential to adopt measures that can challenge the
current funding environment. These will include building the administrative capacity
of both the NDA and NOOs, ensuring NDA independence and the recognition of the
important role which critical NOOs play.
4.2.1 Building the organisational and bureaucratic capacity of the NDA and
NGOs
The paralysis of the NOOs sector has been the result of foreign donors diverting their
funds to the new democratic government (post 1994). Foreign donors anticipated that
funding would reach NGOs through government channels. However, since 1994 there
has been an absence of an effective state funding mechanism. The TNDT was
established in 1996 as a temporary measure to allocate funds. The NDA replaced it in
2000. Both these institutions proved to be ineffective, experiencing major backlogs in
the disbursement of funds to NOOs. It is therefore essential to build the
organisational and bureaucratic capacity of the NDA. This will transform the current
funding procedures and systems. Critical to those procedural issues is the regulation
of the application process and the systematic manner in which applications are
processed. It equally important to build a culture of professionalism and commitment
to rid the bureaucracy of incompetence.
67
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
There is also a need to increase funding for NGOs, particularly for those located in
rural and peri-urban areas. However, most of these NGOs lack the organisational
capacity required by international donors. It is thus important that funding institutions
should develop these NGOs' organisational capacity to meet the requirements for
accessing funds.
4.2.2 NDA independence
The NDA is unique internationally because it is a quasi-independent institution. It is
financially dependent on government but enjoys some degree of autonomy from
government because of the powers it has been accorded. The NDA Act guarantees
powers that ensure independence from government. These powers also emphasise its
responsibility to NGOs. According to section 4.2 of the Act:
TheNDAmay
• Grant money from its funds
i) in accordance with such criteria and procedures as the NDA
determines:
ii) and with due regard to the NDA's pnmary [objective]
referred to in section 3(1), to any civil society organisation
for any project or programme that organisation intends to
undertake or is undertaking;
• make recommendations with regard to legislation and policies directly or
indirectly constraining effective development in the Republic;
• exercise any power conferred by any other provision of this Act; and
• generally, do everything which is necessary to achieve its [objectives]
referred to in section 3.
Although the NDA is largely independent from government this independence is
undermined because it is funded by government. This has manifested itself in the way
the NDA perceives itself and its role. According to the NNP report, the Executive
Board Strategy states that the NDA "is a unique institution that is sponsored by
government yet independent of government. It is not a department of government."
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(http://www.npp.org.za/resources/reports/ndalND A_research. doc). Although it
perceives itself to be independent from government, it appears to view its role as
supporting government. According to the NPP report, "In terms of the NDA Board
Strategy there are 'key macro and sector trends' that inform its strategy. Amongst
these are:
• the effective implementation of the macro-economic policy that has facilitated
stability and balance;
• the fact that the NDA, as a public entity that is the delivery arm of government,
occupies a particular niche in development [within] the country
(http://www.npp.org.za/resources/reports/nda/ND A_research. doc).
This implies that the NDA endorses the government's macro-economic (i.e. GEAR)
strategy despite criticism, which have been levelled against it. NGOs have blamed the
government macro-economic policy for the socio-economic problems, which persits
in South Africa. A joint proposal by Sangoco, Cosatu and South African Council of
Churches (SACC) points out that:
"GEAR reinforced the vicious cycle of poverty by supporting an economic
strategy that did little to support greater equality. Because its proposals for
restructuring the economy remained weak, it effectively maintained South
Africa's historic growth trajectory. That growth path effectively
emphasises minerals production and refining for export - which generates
few jobs, strengthens big business, and reinforces the underdevelopment of
the rural areas. Meanwhile, tight money policies were enforced through
measures to increase interest rates, discouraging domestic investment.
At the same time, GEAR called for measures to reduce the bargaining
power of labour. As that would limit wages and skills development, as
well as aggravating conflict in the workplace, it would worsen productivity
problems. This component of GEAR contradicted the new labour policy,
which involved new laws designed to encourage the more productive use
of labour through greater permanency, protection of labour rights and
collective bargaining, and widespread skills development. For the budget,
a central contradiction emerged between the need to improve government
services for the majority of South Africans and the tight restrictions placed
on government expenditure by GEAR's fiscal targets. As a result,
spending on social services and infrastructure declined steadily in real
terms in the second half of the '90s, undermining a central strategy for
addressing poverty" (http://www.cosatu.org.za/docs/2001/d2001.htm#2.1 ).
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Economic inequality, poverty and unemployment which are atributed to the
neoliberal macroeconomic policies adopted by government and endorsed by
international donor agencies, will further fuel the emergence of advocacy NGOs
"who are increasingly defining their identity and arguments in terms of a globalised,
anti-neoliberalism platform" (Swilling and Russel: 2002: 93).
The NDA has positioned itself within the market economy approach, aligning itself
with government policy despite the advocacy NGOs' position that poverty is linked to
present government policies. The NDAs' support of government policies undermines
its responsibility to these NGOs and its independence. Therefore, it is critical to
amend and to expand the NDA provisions to ensure greater independence. To ensure
greater independence for the NDA, the NNP report recommends that:
• The [NDA] Act should be amended generally to provide for the NDA to
account to the non-profit sector and other sectors of civil society,
• There should be a provision that outlines how government representatives on
the NDA Board must be elected or appointed,
• There should be provision for the NDA budget and business plans to be
influenced by civil society,
• There should be a provision in the Act to ensure that the NDA Board is not the
sole determiner of funding criteria. The law should permit the development of
criteria that are open to public scrutiny
(http://www.npp.org.za/resources/reports/ndaINDA _research. doc ).
4.2.3 Recognition of advocacy
International donors, the government and the NDA appear also to have excluded
NGOs that play an advocacy and policy-determining role in favour ofNGOs that are
seen to be directly involved with service delivery. Apart from providing support to
those NGOs that are struggling to survive, it is also important to assist NGOs that
play an advocacy role and who attempt to influence government policy. Instead of
using NGOs as a cost-effective way of implementing their projects, official donors
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should also support those NGO's who are playing their role in defining the 'general
will' of the marginalised poor. There is an essemtial need to recognise NGOs that
play an advocacy and policy determining role.
4.3 Conclusion
In the final analysis, the current political economy in South Africa is one in which
difficult challenges as well as exciting opportunities face NGOs. NGOs can relate to
government in three different ways. First, they can complement government by filling
existing gaps and providing services. However, this approach does not take into
consideration the policy-influencing role NGOs should play within a political
economy characterised by social inequality. Second, NGOs can relate to government
by opposing it, either directly or by lobbying against it. Again, this approach fails to
recognise the role that NGOs could play in providing social services. Thus, NGOs
should combine both these approaches and use them when necessary. Put in other
words, in meeting the developmental challenges that confront South Africa, NGOs
should not only pursue confrontational agendas, but should also be aware of all
possible avenues for cooperation with government, particularly in service delivery
programs. After all, they will be judged by the extent to which they have managed to
advance a progressive development agenda, not by how much they opposed or
supported the state.
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